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ABSTRACT 
In the recent years in the oil and gas industry, there has been an increased focus on risk management 
in the wake of accidents and unfortunate events involving material damages and/or personnel injury. 
The damage potential in the industry is particularly great during offshore operations, but also other 
stages in field development involve high risk situations which need to be managed and controlled. 
The stakes are high and the companies performing work in the sector are constantly looking for 
means of protecting their assets when being exposed to risk.  
Offshore projects often demand substantial capital investments, several oil companies in joint 
ventures and the involvement of numerous service companies, to take the petroleum field from 
initial discovery to full production. This implies that there is a need for an extensive managing of the 
existing project interfaces, and to ensure an efficient division of liabilities, responsibilities and risk 
between the involved companies. The contract agreement between the various parties, with the 
contracts between the field operator and service companies in the centre of attention, is the 
foremost and most important tool for declaring the obligations of the parties. As such, it also dictates 
the risk exposure and the risk division that the respective parties have to relate to. 
In this report, two different contracts between a service company (“Service Company”) and two of its 
customers, or field operators (“Company 1” and “Company 2”), will be analysed. The focus will be on 
how well the contracts implement and divide operational risk between the parties. Operational risk is 
understood here as the uncertainty-based risk exposure of an organization or company in its day-to-
day activities, as discussed further in the report. The two contracts were chosen from the contract 
portfolio of the Service Company. Their contents were further analysed and compared with a 
standardized contract format, namely the NSC 05. 
The findings in the analyses suggest that the concept of operational risk is not well implemented and 
shared in the contracts. There is of course an explicitly stated division of liability and responsibility 
between the parties in the contracts, as one should expect in contracts of this format. However, the 
lack of an explicit definition and thorough processing of operational risk in the provisions of the 
contracts, render it difficult to say that operational risk as a concept is consciously attended to and 
sufficiently implemented. 
It is further recommended, based on this work, to investigate how to best implement operational risk 
in service contracts, to ensure a common understanding of the concept and to aid in an effective 
management of the risks involved in the contract work. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
Abbreviations and acronyms used in this report are listed below. 
 
ALARP  As Low As Reasonably Practicable  
CAPEX  Capital Expenditure 
E&P  Exploration & Production 
FMECA  Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HAZOP  Hazard And Operability Study 
HSE  Health, Safety & Environment 
NCS  Norwegian Continental Shelf 
NF 07  Norsk Fabrikasjonskontrakt 07 (Norwegian Fabrication Contract 07) 
NTK 07  Norsk Totalkontrakt 07 (Norwegian Total Contract 07) 
NSC 05  Norwegian Subsea Contract 05 
NPD  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
OPEX  Operating Expenditure 
PSA  Petroleum Safety Authority 
SWIFT  Structured What-If Technique 
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TERMINOLOGY 
Some of the central terminology used in this report is further described below. 
Agent The party selling a service or certain goods in a contractual relationship. 
Also known as “contractor”.  
ALARP principle A principle within risk management stating that the risk level should be 
reduced to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable. 
Black swan event 
 
An event, often with major effects, within risk theory that comes as a 
complete surprise for the affected. Also known as an unknown unknown. 
Client The party buying a service or certain goods in a contracting relationship. 
Also known as the “principal” in contract theory. 
Company 
 
When written with a capital, C, the Company refers to a customer of the 
Service Company in the contracts analysed in this report. If not, it 
denotes any company. 
Contractor 
 
The party selling a service or certain goods in a contractual relationship. 
When written with a capital letter, C, the Contractor refers to the Service 
Company in this report. 
Field Operator 
 
A company which is responsible for developing and producing petroleum 
from a reservoir. Often acts as the executive party of a larger license 
group, owning the largest share in a field. Also known as “operator”. 
Principal 
 
The buyer of a service or certain goods in a contractual relationship. Also 
known as “client”.  
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Principal-agent problem 
 
Theory within contract management (and in other areas) which states 
that there are conflicting interests between the principal and agent, due 
to different motives for going into the contractual relationship. 
Service Company 
 
The party selling a service or certain goods in a contractual relationship, 
here, specifically within the oil and gas industry. When written with 
capital letters, S and C, the Service Company, refers to the actual Service 
Company in the analyses of this report, otherwise it refers to any service 
company in the industry.   
The Spread 
 
A collective term covering all equipment, consumables, personnel, 
vessels and barges provided by a service company, or contractor, in 
connection with the work performed in accordance with a contract. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives an introduction into the problem formulation of the report and the justification for 
writing the report. The chapter is divided into several sub-chapters, where the first will be dedicated 
to background information on the topic of the report. The other sub-chapters highlights information 
considered to be relevant for the reader in order to obtain a proper perspective on the work behind 
the report. 
 
1.1 Background 
The petroleum industry is a very interesting field of study, as it embraces numerous different 
disciplines, from advanced technical engineering to intricate business management. It is 
characterized by capital intensive projects with great significance for both local and national society. 
In Norway, the petroleum industry employs about 150,000 people, and accounts for 21.5% of the 
GDP (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2014). The recent fall in the price of Brent crude, where the 
price fell drastically from US$ 112 (average) in June, 2014, to US$ 48 (average) in January, 2015, has 
put its toll on the industry, which, just a year ago, was looking to disclaim its outlook as a “sunset” 
industry in Norway with the discovery of some new exiting prospects in mature areas (Statista, 
2015). This, in combination with the increased cost of field development and operation seen in the 
last decade, will force the industry to turn every stone to change the trend.        
In the recent years of petroleum field development, there has been a substantial focus on risk 
management and compliance with safety standards in the industry (Petroleum Safety Authority 
Norway, 2014). This development has been driven by an increased awareness of the significance of 
risk management, and has been further fuelled by the occurrence of tragic events like the Deepwater 
Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico. With international and national legislation as the backdrop, 
the participants in the industry adhere to industry standards and best practices in the effort to 
increase the safety level in the industry. There is however difference of opinion of how to achieve 
this and which methodology to use in the effort. As have been proven time and time again, accidents 
still occur, although major resources are utilized in increasing the safety level.  
The role of operational risk management in securing assets is vital, as the potential for suffering 
financial and organizational losses is great when dealing with high risk operations involved in 
offshore field development. The Deepwater Horizon accident manifested the tremendous effects of 
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such an event, for all concerned parties. While this event was of the extreme type, there are 
numerous of other occurrences of negative happenings during a contract period, both large and 
small, that raise the question of where the liability belongs. Most often, the issues of liability are a 
concern involving the field operator and one or more of the sub-contractors. Widely accepted 
contract and risk theory prescribe a certain division of these liabilities between the parties, based on 
different parameters such as the relative sizes of the companies, financial strength, ability to absorb 
risk, etc. In practice, however, it may not be the case that these theoretical principles are adhered to.   
Many different companies contribute with their part in a project, and it has been an increasing trend 
with outsourcing in the industry in the last decades, where the field operators have been outsourcing 
more of their former core activities to various service companies (Osmundsen et al., 2010). There is a 
need for an active coordination effort to ensure compliance with the contractual terms. This puts an 
emphasis on having a clear division of responsibility between the parties, and to control the so called 
“grey areas” that one will find in the interfaces of the respective deliveries.        
The contract agreement is the single most important measure that regulates the relationship and 
responsibilities between the contracting parties. As such, it is the leading document for controlling 
the interfaces that exists in a contractual relation. In this respect, it is of great interest to explore how 
well operational risk is implemented and shared in the contracts between field operators and service 
companies. 
 
1.2 Statement of hypothesis 
The report is based on the following hypothesis, H1: 
“Operational risk is well implemented and shared between the parties in contracts between the 
Service Company and its clients.” 
Given this hypothesis, H1, the corresponding null hypothesis, H0, is stated: 
“Operational risk is not well implemented and shared between the parties in contracts between the 
Service Company and its clients”.  
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1.3 Research questions 
From the hypotheses stated above, it is evident that there will be difficulties with presenting a 
satisfyingly clear and objective answer for the hypotheses, as they invite to subjective interpretations 
of the true meaning of the gradations of “well implemented”, and the other element of “well 
shared”. There might also be differences of opinion with regards to the definition of the term 
operational risk, which has to be discussed and clarified in the report.    
In order to obtain a satisfying answer and test the validity of the hypotheses stated above, there is a 
need for a couple of clearly stated research questions, which will be answered in the report. The 
following questions will aid in clarifying the intent of the hypotheses: 
1. What is the understanding of operational risk? 
2. What is meant by “well implemented and shared”? 
 
1.4 Objective 
The objective of this report is to investigate to what degree operational risk is incorporated in 
contracts between a service company and its clients of petroleum field operators, and to analyse 
how this risk is divided between the parties. When the division of risk is a concern, it is of interest to 
find out how the risk is shared and why it is shared in this particular fashion. A selection of two 
contracts between a contractor, i.e. a service company, and two different petroleum field operator 
companies will be examined. 
  
1.5 Selection of methods 
In order to achieve a satisfactory answer to the hypotheses and fulfilment of the objective stated 
above, a number of different methods will be utilized. In order to present theory on the topics of 
contracts and risk, relevant literature will be consulted. The literature is collected both through 
published books, but also articles, published industry standards and reliable internet sources. For the 
investigation of the degree of implementation and division of operational risk in the contracts 
between the Service Company and their clients, a selected amount of contracts will be scrutinized. In 
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addition to this, personnel involved with contract management at the Service Company will be 
consulted. 
  
1.6 Scope of the report 
The scope of this report is restricted to dealing with the coverage of operational risk in two selected 
contracts between the Service Company and its clients of field operator companies. It would also be 
interesting to look into the other types of risk involved and to analyse more contracts, but the 
limitations in available time and resources would render it difficult. Focusing the report on 
operational risk will narrow it down to a field within risk management that will keep it interesting, 
without narrowing it down too much. 
    
1.7 About the author 
The following will present relevant information about the author of the report, which will disclose 
any conflicts of interest and ulterior motives. 
 
1.7.1 Statement of influence 
I am employed by the Service Company on a full time basis, and participate in the two-year master’s 
programme of Industrial Economics at the University of Stavanger in my spare time. This may 
introduce problems related to obtaining a completely unbiased view on the matters at hand. My 
position within the Service Company is, however, with a different department, and not within the 
department that forms and manages the contracts being investigated in this report, or any other 
contracts for that matter. As such, this should provide me with a sufficient amount of objectivity and 
distance to the case for writing the report. 
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1.7.2 Author’s experience 
I have got limited experience with writing case studies, or theses of this magnitude, and no working 
experience within the fields of contract- or risk management. This may lessen the overall quality of 
the work.  
With regards to insight into the more practical parts of the report, I possess several years of 
experience from offshore operations, wherein the hands-on focus on risk assessment and risk 
treatment is used on a daily basis, and before every work task. This may add a valuable dimension to 
the theory presented in the report. 
 
1.8 About the Service Company 
The Service Company is a diversified supplier of equipment and services to the global oil and gas 
industry, covering a large part of the supply chain in petroleum field development and operations. 
This includes engineering, production, delivery, and aftermarket services of both upstream and 
downstream equipment, tools and appliances. The Service Company has got offices, production 
facilities and workshops in strategic locations all around the globe, and is involved in many projects in 
different markets.  
For reasons of confidentiality and respect of the involved companies’ integrity, the identity of the 
Service Company and its customer relationships will be anonymous in the report.    
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1.9 Structure of the report 
The report is structured on the following basis. 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION starts with a presentation of the report, background information 
and problem formulation. In addition, some information about the Service Company 
and the author behind the report is included. 
CHAPTER 2 THEORY, in where relevant contract and risk theory is presented to the reader. The 
contract theory covers the process from procurement to choosing compensation 
formats, and the impact this has got on the inherent risk in the contracts. Finally 
common contract formats in the petroleum industry will be covered. The sub-chapter 
on risk theory will discuss different perspectives on risk, give some examples of 
typical risk exposure in the petroleum industry and finally present the concept of 
operational risk. 
CHAPTER 3 METHOD, which presents some general theory on research and alternatives for 
choice of methods, and the reasoning behind the choice of method for the work on 
this report. 
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSES, where the analyses of the two contracts are performed and presented. 
The chapter is further divided into three sub-chapters, one each for the analyses of 
the contracts and the final one for a comparative analysis of the two contracts. 
CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION, in where the findings in the analysis are viewed in light of the 
hypothesis and the degree of implementation and division of operational risk is 
presented. The potential weaknesses of the analysis are also highlighted, for the 
added perspective of the reader. 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION, which presents the final conclusion of the report and provides 
suggestions for further studies on the topic. 
CHAPTER 7 REFERENCES, lists all the references and sources used for collecting the background 
information for the report. 
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2. THEORY 
In this chapter, an introduction of contract- and risk theory will be presented. The contract theory 
part will deal with general contract theory, procurement, compensation formats and contract 
incentives, with a particular focus on the petroleum industry. The sub-chapter on risk theory will be 
devoted to give an understanding of the term “risk”, which carries a broad base of definitions. Then, 
some examples of risk exposure in the petroleum industry will be presented. Finally, the concept of 
operational risk will be processed. 
      
2.1 Contract theory 
The field of contract theory is vast and comprised of elements from, but not limited to, judicial-, 
financial- and organizational theory. This makes the field of study complex and subject to a wide 
variety of influential aspects. Reflecting on all of these aspects would be outside the scope of this 
report. Accordingly, this chapter will focus on contracts within the petroleum industry. Contracts are 
an important measure in regulating the relationship between the trading partners, as they formalize 
the agreement between the parties and specify the conditions of the contractual relationship. There 
are usually two main parties to a contract, the principal or client, i.e. the party requesting a certain 
service, and the agent or contractor, i.e. the party providing that requested service. However, the 
stakeholders, i.e. the various parties who take interest in the contract, may stretch well beyond the 
relationship between the client and the contractor. There might be interest from government 
authorities, afflicted companies in the industry, sub-contractors, employees, unions and other 
stakeholders in the outcome and formation of the contract. Also, the client and the contractor might 
not necessarily act on their own, but be part of a joint venture or other types of company 
cooperatives. This puts an extra emphasis on the process of the formation and management of the 
contract, and ensuring that this is performed within the boundaries of the ruling laws and 
regulations. It is a principle in Norwegian law to allow for the contracting parties to formulate the 
contract as they see fit. However, most contracts follow a certain standard set-up in order to assure 
predictability and a fair exchange of commerce between the participants in the market. 
The following sub-chapters will deal with relevant theory on procurement, which to a great extent 
lays the foundation of the contractual relationship, then on to theory on different compensation 
formats, which plays a major part in the risk delegation between the contracting parties. Finally an 
introduction into contracts within the petroleum industry will be given. 
18 
 
2.1.1. Procurement 
The procurement process is simply explained the process of obtaining goods and services from one 
or several providers. It is initiated from a defined need and supported by a procurement strategy. 
The overall goal of the procurement process is to obtain high quality goods and services at the lowest 
price possible, while at the same time, keeping within rules and regulations and assuring a 
competitive market. This means that there are compromises to be made, and it is essential to keep a 
high level of efficiency to avoid cost overruns. 
The first stage of developing a procurement strategy consists of demand verification, performing 
relevant analyses and setting a goal for the procurement (Bruvoll, 2014). The demand verification will 
ensure that the goods or services being procured are actually needed by the procurer, and not just 
an arbitrary purchase or a need that can be eliminated. At this stage, the level of detail for what 
needs to be purchased does not have to be too high, as this might put too narrow constraints on the 
continued process. The essence is in understanding how the need came into existence and how the 
supplier market can satisfy this need. When performing analyses, the most important gain is to 
collect valuable information about the supplier market, the associated risks and opportunities with 
the process, and the main cost drivers of the procurement. Here, risk is to be understood as 
procurement risk, that is, unpredictable events that may affect the realization of the contract 
performance (Dimitri et al., 2006). The subject of contract risk will be dealt with in greater detail in 
the next chapter (see chapter 2.2). The last activity of the first stage is to develop a specification of 
the delivery and decide which contract model to use. It is important to keep in mind that the level of 
specification of the delivered product or service will have a great influence on the ability of the 
contractor to perform in accordance with the contract. In some instances it will be preferable to 
restrict the creative freedom of the contractor, while in others the opposite might be the case. The 
level of specification must be decided based on the nature of the delivery (i.e. complexity, cost, 
strategic importance) the competence of the contractor/ supplier market, the competence of the 
procurer, past experiences, etc. Over- and under-specification may have adverse effects on the cost 
of procurement and the cost of performing the contract, and in turn the overall economic results of 
the project. 
The activities described above will serve as the input to the next stage, where the market forces and 
the strategic importance of the procurement are scrutinized to a greater extent. A much used tool 
for performing market analyses are Porter’s five forces. With this method, the main objective is to 
evaluate the forces and threats affecting the market or industry where the procurer operates 
(Bruvoll, 2014). These forces are (see Figure 1 below): 
19 
 
i. Rivalry within the established market 
ii. The threat of substitute products or services 
iii. The threat of new entrants (i.e. companies entering the market/industry) 
iv. Supplier power 
v. Customer power 
 
Figure 1: Porter's Five Forces that affect the formation of strategies (Porter, 2008) 
 
A common tool for assessing the strategic importance of the procurement, and how to deal with the 
suppliers, is Kraljic’s portfolio management method (Brynhildsvoll and Abrahamsen, 2002).The 
method is based on categorizing the procurement along two axes, where the strategic importance of 
the procurement constitutes one axis, while the complexity, or risk, of the supply constitutes the 
other axis. This will further assist the procurer in determining a strategic approach to the 
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procurement. That is, the procurer should trade with its suppliers and the view the procurement 
differently according to the position along the two axes.  
 
Figure 2: Kraljic's portfolio purchasing model (Bruvoll, 2014) 
 
As seen from Figure 2 above, the items that are non-critical (i.e. low in both complexity of and 
strategic importance) do not require too much attention, and the best strategy is to press the prices 
and roam the market for the best deal. The leverage items require some more attention, as they are 
high in strategic importance, but low in complexity of supply. That implies that the there are plenty 
of opportunities to obtain the services/ goods in the market, but since the services/goods are of 
strategic importance to the company, the best purchasing strategy would be to apply buying power 
and leverage over the suppliers. The strategic items are the ones that are high in both complexity 
and strategic importance for the company. Here, the best strategy would be a strategic alliance with 
the supplier, to ensure the stability of supply. Lastly, the bottleneck items are high in complexity of 
supply, but low in strategic importance. These are services/goods that are rare in the market, and the 
suppliers might be few in number. Given the low strategic importance of the purchase of these 
services/ goods, the best strategy would be to secure the supply while actively searching for better 
options in the market.  
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The stages described above should serve as the input for identification of the critical factors for the 
particular procurement. An early identification of the critical factors will contribute to the formation 
of a strategy that will assist the procurer in navigating in the procurement landscape. 
Implementation of the procurement strategy within the organization is the final step on the ladder, 
and one that is often underestimated. Anchoring the strategy and enabling people to work in 
compliance with the strategy is essential for its fulfilment. 
 
2.1.2. Compensation formats and incentive theory 
The choice of compensation format in a contract has an important role in allocating the associated 
contract risks between the parties. A well prepared remuneration scheme will give incentives for 
performing in a certain desirable way, and in accordance with the strategy for the project.  There are 
three main categories of contracts, which are tied to different compensation formats (Dimitri et al., 
2006): 
 Fixed price (“lump sum”) 
 Cost reimbursement 
 Incentive contracts  
In addition to these three contract types, a much utilized compensation format is the day rate/ hour 
rate, where the remuneration is a fixed fee based on days or hours performed in the contract 
(Osmundsen et al., 2010). In most cases, the compensation format chosen in a contract will carry a 
varying degree of elements from all the different types, especially as the complexity of the contract 
or delivery increases. 
A contract in which the contractor is remunerated according to an agreed fixed price, will place most 
of the risk in the hands of the contractor (Dimitri et al., 2006). The contractor will in this case not be 
awarded any compensation in excess of the agreed lump sum, and will hence carry the risk of any 
cost overruns in the project. Accordingly, he will also enjoy any cost savings involved. This is a clear 
advantage for the client, as it removes any uncertainties regarding the cost of the project from their 
hands. However, there are no obvious incentives for the contractor to focus on the quality of the 
delivery when being remunerated based on a fixed price. This may especially prove the case where 
the quality of the delivery is non-verifiable, i.e. where fulfilment of quality standards cannot be 
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verified objectively by a third party. If the contractor is experiencing negative deviations from the 
project budget, it is reasonable to assume that the he will try to save on expenditures linked to the 
cost of quality in the efforts to bring the budget back to balance. This will ultimately lower the quality 
of the deliverance. The client is then the one who must pay the price for the sub-standard delivery. 
Another drawback of this compensation format is the lack of flexibility in addressing change orders 
and variations in the contract deliveries. This may constitute a major cost driver and increase time 
consumption in projects. A fixed price compensation format is most suitable in contracts where there 
is little uncertainty associated with the deliverance and the cost of the delivery. It could also be 
suitable in situations where the client and contractor have a long track-record of past successful 
exchanges of similar nature. Applying a fixed-price compensation format to a contract that deals with 
highly complex and costly deliveries, could on this account have adverse effects for both parties. 
In cost reimbursement contracts, the contractor is reimbursed for all documented costs associated 
with the contracted delivery (ibid.). This implies that the contractor is shielded against any cost 
overruns, as he will enjoy a full remuneration of his expenditures related to the project. The 
contractor will thus have few incentives for performing cost-reducing activities, and this might serve 
as a major cost driver in the project. Most often, a ceiling for allowable costs are included in the 
contract, to ensure that the contractor does not incur any unnecessary costs, which will increase the 
likelihood of having post contract conflict. A solid contractor that expects to compete for future 
contracts, and thus have to take care of his reputation, is not likely to abuse the flexibility of the 
contract format. However, this may not be the case where a contractor is heading for insolvency and 
ultimately bankruptcy. Cost reimbursable contracts can be thought of as the counterparts of the 
fixed-price contracts, as they place the risk of budget overruns with the client. The use of this type of 
compensation format is most suitable in projects where the focus on quality of the delivery trumps 
the considerations against cost. Since the contractor is reimbursed all associated costs, it is more 
likely that he will put an extra effort into the quality aspect of the project, as opposed to if he did not 
see any rewards for such investments. However, the degree of quality is not perfectly correlated 
against the level of investment in quality measures, as there will always be inefficiencies involved. 
Also, the contractor may be willing to cut corners and finish the contract early if he is able to go on to 
the next, more lucrative, future contract. Another situation, in where cost reimbursement may be 
advantageous, is in projects where there is a great likelihood of experiencing substantial design 
changes after initiation of the contract activities. Variations and changes in contracts and project 
scope, especially post contract signing, can be very costly and time consuming. Thus, by eliminating 
the need for renegotiating the contract, the flexibility of the cost reimbursement contract can aid in 
minimizing budget and schedule overruns. 
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While fixed-price contracts and cost reimbursement contracts delegate risk to either the contractor 
or the client, incentive contracts attempt to provide a more balanced division of contract risk. The 
size of the remuneration will depend on compliance with a set of pre-determined targets for the 
contract delivery. The incentives included in the contract can be based on reaching a target cost, or 
based on key performance indicators (e.g. HSE statistics), quality of deliverance, meeting the 
schedule, etc. The incentives are most often a measure in a “carrot and stick” policy directed at the 
contractor. The “carrot” could then include being awarded a share in cost savings, or entitlement to a 
bonus in the event of a successful delivery according to some pre-set project goals. On the contrary, 
the “whip” could for example involve fines for schedule overruns (e.g. a fixed fine per day late), a 
share in cost overruns, a reduction in remuneration due to sub-standard delivered quality, etc. 
Although it might be tempting to develop a contract that includes many incentives for steering the 
contractor in the right direction, it is important to consider the transaction costs associated with a 
complex incentives scheme (ibid.). Controlling the fulfilment of the incentives scheme may be a 
tedious task for the client, and disagreements between the parties may evolve into an open and 
damaging conflict. On this account, the design of incentives in a contract must be given careful 
consideration in forming a contract. The incentives must be measureable, observable by both 
contracting parties, within the contractor’s control sphere and verifiable by third parties outside of 
the contract agreement (Osmundsen et al., 2010). It is difficult to assign a numerical value to a 
subjective measure, assuring an objective evaluation of the incentives. Also, in contract agreements, 
there will most likely be an asymmetric information basis which further hampers the client’s ability to 
control the fulfilment of the contract. The client may not have the time, ability or know-how to verify 
the degree of compliance with the incentives scheme. Accordingly, incentives must be used with care 
in contracts.  
 A much used compensation format in offshore oil service contracts are day rates (ibid.). This involves 
remuneration based on the number of days of use of a rig, equipment and tools, personnel, etc. As 
such, this type of compensation format resembles a format somewhere between the cost-
reimbursement format and the incentives format described above. The remuneration is fixed on an 
agreed day-rate, where the actual number of days will vary around a target date or within a set 
contract period. The incentive element in this compensation format is based on varying the day rate.  
It is common to differentiate the rate according to operational status, i.e. the day rate will vary 
depending on whether the rig/equipment/personnel are in modes of active operation, maintenance, 
stand-by, etc. The day rate could, for example, be divided into (Osmundsen et al., 2005): 
 Operating day rate per day (OR); 
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 Stand-by rate per day = OR x 0.90; 
 Moving rate per day = OR x 0.80; 
 Suspension rate per day = OR x 0.5; 
 Lay-up rate per day = OR x 0.5; 
 Re-drilling rate per day = OR x 0.25; 
 No payment rate. 
Altering the day rate compensation according to operational status gives the contractor incentives 
for keeping the rig/equipment in the operational status that provides the highest possible 
compensation. Intuitively, this should increase the efficiency in the project by giving the contractor 
incentives for keeping his rig/equipment in the highest operational state and thereby reach the 
target of the project. This might however carry negative effects, as the contractor then is more 
tempted to focus on short term gains, and neglect necessary maintenance, at the expense of more 
favourable long-term benefits. Such short-term focus may not only prove to be adverse for the 
contractor, but also for the client, as the risk of failure in the future is increased. Also, designing an 
incentives scheme that places the risk at the party who is the best suited at controlling the risk, might 
prove challenging as the risk control interfaces often overlap. In oil service contracts, the projects are 
most often a collaborative effort between many different service companies offering complementary 
services in the aid of the overall project (Osmundsen et al., 2010). The drilling of a well, for example, 
involves the contribution of multiple service companies providing drilling equipment, well logging, 
completion equipment, logistics, cement, etc. It is given that all of these different service companies 
have limited control over the overall progress of the drilling program. Hence, an incentive based on 
the overall target success of the well will not be effective if implemented in contracts for the service 
companies (ibid.). 
As mentioned initially in this sub-chapter, the compensation format in a contract, in addition to the 
chosen incentive scheme, plays an important role in the division of risk between the contracting 
parties. However, the considerations on risk sharing in contracts based on the introduction of 
incentives, present a possible conflict of interest that should be commented on (Osmundsen, 1999). 
By implementing incentives in a contract, the aim is introduce measures to decrease the impact of 
the “principal-agent problem”, by shifting some of the risks involved over to the agent to increase 
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effectiveness, decrease costs, etc. However, most risk theory prescribes that the party that is better 
suited at absorbing the risk, should be the one exposed to the risk. Usually, this would be the 
principal (field operator), whom has got a better ability than the agent (service company) to spread 
the risk through, for example, portfolio management, joint ventures and financial solidity (ibid.).  
A simple example of the “principal-agent problem” is the role of a car salesman (agent) and the 
owner of the car dealership (principal) (Osmundsen, 2015). The car salesman wants to earn as much 
money for as little effort/work as possible, while the owner of the car dealership wants to sell as 
many cars as possible for as little man-hours (i.e. wage costs) spent as possible. If the car salesman is 
paid a fixed wage, he will most likely not bother too much about making an extra car sale, as it does 
not affect his pay. On the other hand, if his fixed pay is low and he is offered an additional bonus 
based on the number of cars he sells, he will have incentives for working hard to selling the extra 
amount of cars. This way, the interests of the car salesman and the owner of the dealership are more 
aligned. However, with the introduction of a wage based on bonuses, the car salesman is now more 
exposed to risk than with a fixed wage. Some of these risks, such as market decrease or collapse, 
increased competition from other car dealerships, etc., are outside of the control sphere of the 
salesman. In addition, there exists an asymmetry of information. The car salesman possesses 
valuable knowledge and know-how of selling a car, while he might not see the bigger picture and the 
larger movements in the market. A couple of questions arise from this:  
 Who is the most suited party for carrying this risk?  
 Who possesses the best ability of mitigating the risks involved? 
The answer to this is not perfectly clear, but it should be noted that most risk theory prescribes that 
the party that is best suited at absorbing the risk should be the one to carry it, as also stated above. 
From this, it is evident that the introduction of incentives in a contract does not come without also 
introducing potential pitfalls. 
 
2.1.3. Contracts in the petroleum industry 
Contracts in the petroleum industry are often concerning major projects, with high capital 
expenditures and risk. As the industry is moving towards more challenging production areas, through 
deeper waters, harsher climates and more complex wells, the technological frontier is expanding 
further than ever before. As the type of deliveries and manufactured equipment increase in 
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complexity, there is an extra emphasis on preparing solid contracts, with a fair risk sharing and clear 
division of the responsibilities between the involved parties. When new technologies are 
implemented, there are always inherent uncertainties involved, increasing the risk exposure. At the 
same time, as the cost component of investments and operations has increased substantially through 
the last decades on the NCS (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2014), there has been a focus on 
standardization of equipment and project processes. An example of this is the so-called fast-track 
approach for marginal subsea fields, i.e. small subsea fields. The contribution from marginal fields is 
considered to be important for maintaining the production output from the NCS (Statoil, 2015a). The 
aim of the fast-track philosophy is to cut the lead time from discovery to start-up of production from 
the fields, in addition to standardizing processes and utilizing best-practices from previous field 
developments to reduce the necessary investment costs. Standardization and new technology 
development have traditionally not been considered to complement each other, especially within 
project management theory (Gardiner, 2005). However, with improved project processes and sound 
contract management, it is possible to extract the best of both worlds. The cost dimension, in 
addition to handling the risks involved with the implementation of new technology, will stress the 
need for having proper contracts between the parties.  
There has been a trend in the industry where the oil companies have outsourced more and more of 
the work associated with developing the fields, which has increased the need for extensive contract 
management and handling the interfaces between the companies and the sub-contractors 
(Osmundsen et al., 2005). This has been a major driver for the growth of the oil service companies, 
who provide services such as drilling, well completions, logging operations, wireline operations, 
subsea operations, and other related services for field development. The growth of the oil service 
companies, in combination with the introduction of smaller E&P companies, have to some degree 
shifted the balance between the oil companies and service companies. The big oil service companies 
in the industry have expanded their range of services to be able to contribute in a larger part of the 
supply chain. It has become more usual for the bigger service companies to offer so-called 
engineering, procurement, construction and installation (EPCI) projects which really involves a full 
scale of services (Kaasen, 2006). This has also lead to a shift in how the oil companies and service 
companies interact with each other. There are now examples of oil companies utilizing the “know-
how” of the service companies in extracting valuable information from the reservoirs, as opposed to 
previous common practice, where the oil companies possessed most of this knowledge themselves. 
Examples of partnerships where the risks, including the possible gains, in trying out new technologies 
have been shared between an oil company and a service company have also occurred. See (McIninch 
et al., 2002) for more about such a case. 
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In practice, the contracting parties can choose to form the contracts between them however they 
see fit, choosing different contract formats and conditions depending on the complexity and impact 
of the project to be undertaken. The common practice on the NCS is however to utilize contracts 
with standardized conditions, such as the Norwegian Fabrication Contract 07 (NF 07 or “Norsk 
Fabrikasjonskontrakt 07”), Norwegian Total Contract 07 (NTK 07 or “Norsk Totalkontrakt 07”) and the 
Norwegian Subsea Contract 05 (NSC 05) (Kaasen, 2006). The standard conditions of contract are then 
usually supplemented by more project-specific terms and conditions in various exhibits. 
The NSC 05 is especially formed for the purpose of contracts regarding construction and installation 
of subsea equipment from floating vessels. There are obvious advantages with having standardized 
terms and conditions in contracts. One of the main advantages is that the foundation in the contract 
is already in place and that there is little time spent in negotiating on the basics of the contract. 
Another advantage is how the standardized conditions give predictable and equal terms for all 
providers, large and small.  
The conditions in the standardized contracts of NF 07 and NTK 07, mentioned above, was worked out 
in a joint effort between the operators Statoil ASA and Norsk Hydro ASA (today a part of Statoil ASA) 
on the one side, and the employers’ organization Teknologibedriftenes Landsforening, now Norsk 
Industri (Norwegian Industry) on the other. The formation of the standardized contracts of today is 
part of a work that began already in the 1970s, when large foreign oil companies constituted the 
majority of operators on the fields of the NCS. At this time the Norwegian petroleum industry, 
including the sub-contractors, was generally underdeveloped. The oil companies brought with them 
terms and conditions used in contracts in their other international activities, which were considered 
unusual, and to some extent unfair, in the eyes of the Norwegian sub-contractors (ibid.). This 
initiated a need for negotiations between the operators and contractors for drawing up a 
standardized set of contracts, more suitable for the Norwegian conditions and in coherence with 
Norwegian law.   
The NSC 05, on the other hand, was formed through negotiations between the Norwegian operator, 
Statoil ASA, on the one side, and the subsea contractors Stolt Offshore (now Acergy), Subsea 7 and 
Technip Offshore Norge, on the other side (Norsk Olje & Gass, 2005). The NSC 05 is built on much of 
the same foundation as of that for the NF 07 and NTK 07, but it is adjusted to account for some of 
the more special features of projects in the subsea environment. Such features include articles 
regarding downtime due to unfavourable weather, conditions of the soil and seabed, “the Spread”, 
the effect a variation to the work will have on the contractors other contractual obligations, i.e. 
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regarding other contracts than the one in question, and more detailed terms about cancellation fees 
in relation to time to mobilization (Kaasen, 2006). “The Spread” is a term covering all the installation 
vessels and barges, equipment, personnel and consumables provided by the contractor during the 
performance of the work. The NSC 05 covers both contracts concerning “installation only” and EPCI-
type contracts, and the associated risks involved with such subsea projects (Norsk Olje & Gass, 2005). 
As such its contents are highly relevant for this report. 
The articles in the NCS 05 cover the conditions of contract. Article 2 specifies the various exhibits, or 
project-specific contents, that are a part of the contract. These exhibits are (ibid.): 
A. Scope of work 
B. Compensation format 
C. Contract schedule 
D. Administration requirements 
E. Company’s documents (specifications) 
F. Company’s deliverables 
G. Company’s insurances 
H. Subcontractors 
I. Contractor’s specification 
J. Standard forms of guarantees 
It is in these exhibits that the contracting parties can form the distinctive terms and conditions 
relevant for the specific work to be undertaken. The terms of the conditions of contract are general, 
and merely provide guidance and leeway for the parties to perform further specifications in the 
exhibits, which otherwise could not be stated in the standard conditions of contract. The contents of 
the exhibits are often obtained from the tender documents prepared by the Company and the tender 
prepared by the Contractor. Although the contents of the exhibits are not standardized, such as the 
conditions of contract, a certain re-use of terms in the exhibits has been observed, much due to the 
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similarities between the field operators, and that the projects to a large degree utilize the same 
contract administrators (Kaasen, 2006). The articles in the conditions of contract often refer to 
exhibits, such as Article 7 Subcontractors, which refers to Exhibit H Subcontractors. However, 
according to Article 2.3, in the event of conflict between the provisions of the contract documents, 
the conditions of contract shall be given priority above that of the exhibits (Norsk Olje & Gass, 2005). 
 
2.2 Risk theory 
This sub-chapter will present relevant risk theory and seek to clarify the nomenclatures given within 
the field. Risk as a concept is something everyone can relate to, and is ever present in all our 
dealings, from trivial day-to-day activities to highly complex projects. It is however associated with 
multiple interpretations of its exact meaning, where a broad base of definitions form the backdrop. 
In an industry where the standardization of both tool and terminology is highly revered, it is of 
importance to reach somewhat of a consensus of how to understand the term risk. An introduction 
to the concept of risk will be given in this sub-chapter, in addition to presenting examples of some of 
the many risks that are present in the petroleum industry. Finally, the field of operational risk will be 
treated. 
 
2.2.1 Introduction to the concept of risk 
The concept of risk most commonly involves the notion of risk being the product of a probability, or 
likelihood, and the associated consequences of the occurrence of some future event. The probability 
is derived from past experience and the collection of data from similar phenomena, and the 
consequences are constituted from an analysis of the event itself and the likely aftermath of the 
event. It is common to assign numerical values and probability distributions to the probabilities and 
consequences of the events when calculating the level of risk. This numerical value of the risk level 
one is faced with often constitutes an important part of the decision-making when planning projects, 
forming strategies, performing sourcing, etc. Such a numerical value is used to present the risk level 
of an activity in a way that shows the relative risk of performing the activity, as compared to other 
alternative options. This also gives the impression of risk as being of an objective nature, which can 
be proven to be a gross misconception of the true meaning of the term. It is a view by some risk 
management professionals that risk can be described by means of objective terms. See for example 
the article “Why COSO is flawed” (Samad-Khan, 2005), where the author claims the only true way of 
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handling risk, is by basing risk assessment on analysis of historical data and presenting the 
conclusions as objective numbers.  
There are, however, other risk management professionals who question the existence of such 
objective risk interpretations. In fact, there are very few presentations of risk stemming from risk 
analysis that can be characterized as being objective in the sense that (Aven, 2010): 
i. The outcome exists independently of the assessors, or 
ii. There is a consensus among all stakeholders about the outcome of the analysis 
The first condition can surely be met when assessing non-complex events with a low level of 
uncertainty, here meaning that the consequential aspect is fully known for the assessor. For instance, 
the toss of a dice is clearly independent of the assessor. However, the second condition is not as 
easily fulfilled. The rationale behind this claim is evident when one considers risk perception and risk 
attitude. Risk perception can be thought of as the subjective view of an individual, group or 
community towards risk. This valuation of risk and risk level is believed to be generated through 
personal belief or collective communal experience and cultural traditions (ibid.). When assessing risk 
and determining risk levels when faced with important decision-making, it is of the essence to take 
into account the perception of risk of those affected by the decision and by those who are 
responsible of making the decision, as this will most likely ease the implementation of the decision 
later on in the process. The attitude towards risk by those involved in the risk analysis process is also 
something that needs to be considered when evaluating the objectivity of the work performed and 
the results obtained. Risk attitude describes the individual’s or group’s natural approach to situations 
or events characterized by uncertain outcomes.   An individual’s or group’s risk attitude is usually 
separated into three different characterisations (Ross et al., 2011) : 
 Risk averse – takes a careful approach in uncertain situations and will chose a certain 
outcome over an uncertain one if found more favourable.  
 Risk neutral – does not carry any preference and would be just as happy with taking the bet 
as by choosing the safer option.   
 Risk seeking – prefers the uncertain outcome over the certain one if there are opportunities 
of higher gains by taking on the gamble. 
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A simple example will clarify the differences between the three. You are faced with a choice where 
there are two alternatives, the first being guaranteed a certain amount of money, say $500, and the 
second, taking on a gamble where there is a 50% chance of winning $1000 and 50% chance of 
winning nothing (e.g. by means of a coin toss). The risk-averse person would prefer the first 
alternative and receive the guaranteed money, as he would dislike being exposed to the risk of 
winning nothing. The risk-neutral person could choose either alternative, as he would see benefits 
from both options. The risk-seeking person, however, would go for the alternative where there is an 
opportunity of a higher price, regardless of the uncertainty involved. Thus, he would most likely go 
for the second alternative.        
Risk and uncertainty are terms that are often considered to be synonyms and used to describe the 
same phenomena, especially in financial contexts (Aven, 2010). The degree of uncertainty is then 
reflected around an expected value, derived from probability calculations. However, risk captures a 
wider dimension than uncertainty, in that uncertainty is more of an element within a risk description, 
rather than the other way around. On this account, one should tread carefully when choosing 
terminology. Uncertainty is more related to the variance of a probability, or expected value, and the 
variance in a population of consequences, whereas risk also takes into account the severity of the 
consequential aspects (ibid.). As an example, consider the number of fatalities from car accidents in a 
year. This number is relatively stable from one year to the next, and can be predicted with a 
relatively high confidence, i.e. the variance and hence uncertainty would be low. There is a great 
amount of data available, making the statistical interpretations very solid. One would however not 
deem the risks of driving a car as negligible, as the consequences may be severe. This example shows 
how the uncertainty associated with a phenomenon can be low, while at the same time having a high 
risk.   
It is acknowledged that risk is something that cannot be totally eliminated, but is something that 
needs to be controlled and managed (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). Risk is an intrinsic part of all aspects 
of our actions, and it would thus be practically impossible to design a risk management scheme that 
leaves no uncertainties of what the future will bring. It is also important to point out that risk is not 
only connected to the adverse consequences of events, but also the positive opportunities that lie 
within the uncertain outcome of the same events. After all, undertaking a project also involves 
reaping the benefits of higher than expected profits. Risk management is a collective term used to 
describe the measures and activities performed by an organization to control risk. To obtain a more 
effective treatment of risk within an organization, it is common to distinguish between three 
different types of risk, that is (Aven, 2008): 
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 Strategic risk – related to factors that are important to an organization’s long-term strategy 
 Financial risk – such as market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk, or risk that is outside of the 
control sphere of the organization 
 Operational risk – or risk connected to the organization’s normal conduction of activities. 
To further understand the risks involved with an operation, it is common to perform a risk analysis. A 
risk analysis is a process that is integral in the risk management efforts and decision-making 
situations. In this process, the main objective is to obtain high-quality information about the situation 
in question, map the associated uncertainties and present the findings in an understandable way to 
the stakeholders. It is a three-stage process that consists of the following main elements (ibid.): 
1. Planning 
2. Risk assessment 
3. Risk treatment 
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Figure 3: The risk analysis process (Aven, 2008) 
 
As seen from Error! Reference source not found. above, the first step in performing a risk analysis is 
a problem formulation, where the reason for conducting the analysis is described. It involves the 
gathering of a working group, with knowledge of both the system to be analysed, and also 
professionals with experience within analysis techniques. A plan is drawn up, where the 
responsibilities, scope, time limits, milestones and the budget of the analysis is stated. An important 
activity in this step is the gathering of information about the system to be analysed, and also a 
presentation of the boundaries of the analysis, and where it is suitable for application. An analysis 
concerning one situation may not be relevant for the next. It is recommended to identify the 
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stakeholders at an early stage of the analysis, and the planning process stands out as a good time to 
do this.  
The selection of a suitable analysis method is also a vital part of the planning process. Different 
systems and problems are not necessarily analysed and solved by the same methodology. In general, 
there are two main approaches when choosing the appropriate method, that is, the forward and the 
backward approach (ibid.). In the forward approach, the risk analysis follows a chronological path, 
where the initiating events are identified before the consequences are analysed. For example, when 
analysing a car as our system, we begin by looking at the initiating events, e.g. rupture in the brake 
fluid hose, and thereafter analyse the possible consequences of this, e.g. loss of brake capacity. In 
the backward approach, the analysis follows a retrospective path where the consequences are 
identified before the initiating events. In the example with the car, this would mean moving from 
identifying loss of brake capacity as the consequence, and then analysing this and finding brake hose 
rupture as one initiating event that could lead to this. The forward approach is generally considered 
to be more time- and resource demanding than the backward approach, as it generates more details. 
Several initiating events may share the same consequence, e.g. the initiating event of worn brake 
pads shares the consequence of loss of brake capacity with the initiating event of rupture in brake 
fluid hose. Thus, moving in a retrospective path as in the backward approach may be more 
convenient for an overall general analysis of a system. It is important to keep in mind that an 
extensive amount of detail included in the analysis may hamper the ability of the reader to extract 
the important points of the analysis.  
The second step in performing a risk analysis is the activities included in the risk assessment (Aven, 
2008). The first activity is identifying the initiating events of unwanted incidents associated with the 
system or situation the analysis is focused on. The inputs for this identification work may be past 
experience with similar situations, extraction of data from databases, use of inspections and 
assumptions, etc. Common techniques for identifying initiating events are HAZOP (Hazards and 
Operability study), SWIFT (Structured What-If Technique), FMECA (Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality 
Analysis), Bayesian networks and others. It is worth to note that these methods have different 
quantitative and qualitative properties, and that they are often complementary to each other. 
Therefore, when performing analyses on complex systems, it may be beneficial to use two or more of 
these methods for extracting different pieces of information concerning the system. Following the 
identification of the initiating events, the next activities are cause and consequence analyses. In the 
cause analysis the various conditions for the occurrence of the initiating event are identified, while 
the consequence analysis looks at the possible aftermath of each initiating event. A helpful tool for 
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presenting the results from these analyses is the bow-tie diagram (see Figure 4 for an example). This 
is a good representation which shows the causal links between the cause and the effect of an event. 
The bow-tie diagram is also widely used in the petroleum industry, with its widespread focus on 
barrier-thinking in accident prevention. 
 
 
Figure 4: Representation of a bow-tie diagram (ERM Americas Risk Practice, 2014) 
 
The final activity in the risk assessment is the presentation of the risk level through a risk picture, 
which is based on the previous activities of identifying possible events, their causes and 
consequences. The risk picture covers all relevant aspects of the risks involved, such as (Aven, 2008): 
 Expected values, or predictions, of relevant values connected to the event (e.g. cost or 
fatalities) 
 The associated uncertainties with both the occurrence of the event itself and the 
consequences the event will generate. 
 Probability distributions of the events and outcomes, showing the variance around the 
expected values. 
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Using a risk matrix with probability and consequences along the axes, will on a general basis be a 
good picture of the risks associated with the different identified events. See Figure 5 below for a 
representation of a typical risk matrix. Often, the matrix is sub-divided into three different zones 
characterized by different colours, such as green for acceptable risk, orange for risks that should be 
reduced to as low as reasonably possible (by means of the ALARP-principle) and red for risks that are 
unacceptable. The distributions of the different colours, i.e. the respective areas they occupy in the 
matrix, are for example based on risk tolerance, company-internal requirements or government 
regulations/ requirements. However, a risk matrix is merely a glance at the various risk exposures, 
and it does not give insight into the background knowledge that constitutes the foundation of the 
probability distributions. Important information may be hidden behind the colours of the matrix. On 
this account, the risk matrix should never be presented without also presenting the background 
information behind the results of the analysis. 
 
Figure 5: Example of a typical risk matrix (Aven, 2008) 
  
The final step in the risk analysis process is the risk treatment, that is, the tools and processes used in 
modifying the risks, comparing alternatives and the management review and judgement (ibid.). 
When comparing the different alternatives, useful tools are cost-benefit analyses and cost-
effectiveness analyses, which compares the cost of modifying a risk with the effect it will have on 
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reducing the risk exposure. Most risks can be reduced or even eliminated given the right amount of 
resources, but the cost of doing so may not be possible to pay for the concerned party. Another point 
here is the difficulty one may encounter in determining the cost of a risk reducing measure. When 
implementing a risk reduction measure, the effect will not be manifested immediately, but rather in 
the near or distant future. Estimating the future value of present investments is not an easy task, and 
the uncertainties will grow ever larger as the time frame is extended. It may also be challenging to 
assign monetary values to qualitative aspects, e.g. the improved working atmosphere when 
implementing noise reduction efforts at a workplace. Finally, the work performed in the previous 
stages of the analysis will be taken into consideration in a management review and used as input in 
the decision-making. Here, as elsewhere in handling risk, it is important to emphasize that the 
decision-making should not be an automatic exercise (Ibid.). The risk analysis should not be reduced 
to a number crunching event, where data is used as input, and a number presenting the risk level of 
the activities is presented as the output, readily served for the executives to make the final decision. 
The management needs to take ownership of the risk analysis process and base their decision-
making on the whole picture, not just the summary. 
When it comes to concluding with a definition of the term risk, there has not yet been reached a 
proper consensus among the professionals and organizations dealing with risk management. 
According to the ISO 31000:2009 standard for risk management, the definition of risk is (Purdy, 
2010): 
“[The] effect of uncertainty on objectives.” 
 This definition is very general and open, and may include both positive and negative outcomes of 
risk. However, as stated above, risk captures a wider phenomenon than that covered by uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is a key element within risk, but risk is also so much more than uncertainty. A definition 
which covers most of important aspects of risk is the following (Aven, 2008): 
“Risk is equal to the two-dimensional combination of events/consequences and associated 
uncertainties.” 
A refinement of this definition follows in Aven’s Misconceptions of Risk (Aven, 2010): 
“By risk we understand the two-dimensional combination of 
i. events A and the consequences of these events C, and 
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ii. the associated uncertainties U (whether A will occur and what value C will take).” 
This definition captures the essentials of risk, in that it represents the following important attributes 
of risk (ibid.): 
 It represents both desirable and undesirable outcomes. 
 It handles uncertainties and not mere probabilities and expected values 
 It does not attempt to quantify risk and consequences of events 
On this account, the definition stated above will be used as how the author understands the term 
risk throughout the report. 
  
2.2.2 Risk in the petroleum industry 
The petroleum industry is characterized by high risk offshore operations and large projects with 
substantial CAPEX and OPEX. Since its early days in the 20th century, the industry has evolved from 
drilling wells and producing oil and gas from relatively easy accessible fields onshore, to highly 
complex deepwater drilling and production offshore. In the search for sustained production outputs, 
the industry is moving towards harsher environments and pushing the boundaries for the existing 
technology. Parallel to this development, society has become ever more dependent on fossil fuels, 
driven by an increased standard of living and the industrialization of populous countries such as India 
and China. Large projects in the petroleum industry often carry substantial significance for national 
interests, not only due to the importance of securing  and extracting energy sources, but also due to 
the great impact the projects can have on the national economy. This fact has put an additional 
emphasis on the conduction of safe operations through an increased awareness on risk 
management.   
The risks and uncertainties associated with the petroleum industry are not only restricted to the time 
before the field is in production, but are present in all aspects of the life of the field, from geological 
surveys and exploration drilling, to production, intervention operations and finally plugging the wells 
and abandoning the field. Ideally, the contracts regulating the work performed during the lifespan of 
a field should be able to treat all possible events and ensure a fair division of the responsibility and 
risk involved. In practice, however, this would prove to be an impossible task as that would require 
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contracts with a stupendous amount of detail. Also, the future is difficult to predict, and there will 
always be a risk of having so-called “black swan” events.   
The following are some examples of the typical risks the operators and service companies are 
exposed to. The list is by no means exhaustive, as it is beyond the scope of this report to go into such 
detail. It is however important to get an understanding of some of the various aspects of risk that 
characterize the industry, and form the backdrop when incorporating risk division in the service 
contracts. 
 
2.2.2.1 Risk in exploration and production 
When an exploration- and production (E&P) company sets out to explore for petroleum reservoirs, 
they embark on a journey filled with uncertainty. Exploration demands the access to areas of 
interest, usually granted the companies through a licensing round (Statoil, 2015b). Being in a position 
to obtain a license for E&P is vital for a company. Often the petroleum fields are shared between 
several different companies in a license group. This implies that the obligations, expenditures and 
income derived from the activities in E&P from the field are shared between the participants of the 
licence group. Risk sharing in such a fashion is a door opener for smaller E&P companies, whom 
would otherwise struggle to obtain the financing required for developing the field. It also acts as a 
facilitator for a portfolio strategy, wherein the licensees can be partially involved in various different 
fields and thereby spread their risk exposure. In addition, it allows the companies to position 
themselves in strategic moves towards increased knowledge on certain types of fields, e.g. 
deepwater fields, by enabling them a buy-in without having to carry the full investment.      
The potential for hydrocarbon contents and the reservoir characteristics, i.e. the geological 
properties of the reservoir such as the porosity (volume between sand grains – space for oil) and 
permeability (the conduit between the pores in the reservoir stone), is the typical centre of the risk 
assessments performed by the E&P companies (Allan, 2014). The rationale behind this is fairly easy 
to understand when looking at all the uncertainty involved in the stages from obtaining a license until 
a field is in full production. When a discovery is made through a geological survey (collection and 
interpretation of seismic data), there are large uncertainties associated with both the size and the 
contents of the reservoir. The next steps for proving the discovery is by hiring a drilling unit, such as a 
drilling rig or drill ship, and perform drilling down to the assumed petroleum reservoir. Drilling down 
to the reservoir is the only reliable mean of proving the contents of the reservoir, as the maps 
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obtained from the seismic survey will only present an interpretable image of the underground 
formation and the existence of an oil trap, or reservoir play. Once the reservoir is confirmed to 
contain oil, gas, condensate or other commercially valuable resources, further wells, so-called 
appraisal wells, need to be drilled in order to determine the extent of the reservoir. Before this, there 
is no certain way of estimating the real volumes of the reservoir. The uncertainties associated with 
hiring and operating a drilling rig for the period of developing the field, will also expose the operator 
and license group to risk. In times when the rig market is tight, i.e. the availability of rigs are low, the 
rig owners can negotiate good terms for both rates and how much incentives for risk exposure they 
will accept in the contract, which of course leads to a negative exposure on behalf of the operator 
and the licence group. Unavailability of rigs, and especially rigs capable of operating in deeper 
waters, has been considered to be a great bottleneck in the further exploration of the NCS. This has 
driven the rig hire rates to record high levels, and has in combination with a lower level of efficiency 
lead to a substantially high cost level for drilling on the NCS. See (Osmundsen et al., 2008) and 
(Osmundsen et al., 2005) for further discussions on this issue.      
Another factor introducing uncertainty in this estimate is the amount of recoverable oil or gas from 
the reservoir. No reservoir will have a perfect (100%) drainage, and there will always be residue 
amounts of oil and gas left behind due to the fluid dynamic properties between the reservoir rock 
and the produced liquid (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2009). In fact, the average recovery rate 
on the NCS is around 46 percent, ranging from 20 percent to 60 percent depending on the type of 
field (higher recovery rates from wells on fixed platforms than for subsea fields), reservoir 
characteristics (porosity and permeability) and liquid characteristics (heavy oil, light oil, gas, 
condensate etc.) (Norsk Olje og Gass, 2012). Increased recovery rates from the fields on the NCS is a 
major focus for both the Norwegian government and the field operators, as the use of existing 
infrastructure to produce greater amounts from the reservoirs will generate billions in additional 
revenue. However, the uncertainty associated with the estimates of the amount of recoverable 
reserves, provides the licensees with difficulties in estimating how much potential value they can 
actually realize from the field.                    
The oil price is also a large contributor of uncertainty, and a direct element in the income from the 
produced resources. Historically the oil price has fluctuated in accordance with supply and demand, 
but isolated events like war outbreaks and economic recessions, have also contributed to the rise 
and fall of the oil price (WTRG Economics, 2011). The oil companies will usually have difficulties with 
insuring themselves from fluctuations in the oil price, and it is a risk that is outside of their control 
sphere.  
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2.2.2.2 Blow-out 
A blow-out is an event where there is an uncontrolled flow of reservoir fluids into the well. A blow-
out may be both underground and over ground, i.e. where the well fluids reach the surface 
(Schlumberger, 2015). Once on the surface, there is a large risk of ignition of the gases erupting from 
the well, with a resulting explosion and fire. A major surface blow-out is by far the most devastating 
event that can take place during offshore drilling. It is an event where the consequences are 
enormous, ranging from massive material damages, injuries and loss of lives, environmental damages 
and financial impacts. The Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 is a reminder of 
these mentioned effects. As a singular event, a blow-out stands out as the biggest threat to offshore 
well operations, and the companies and personnel involved in the operation. Accordingly, the drilling 
and production procedures, and safety regime offshore, are primarily formed in the purpose of 
keeping control of the well, and secondarily reduce the consequences if the well control is lost.  
The oil industry in Norway is working in accordance with a double barrier philosophy. This means 
that there should be a minimum of two barriers against the uncontrolled flow of reservoir fluids (i.e. 
oil and gas) at all times when performing drilling, well completions, interventions in the well (e.g. 
maintenance and repair in the well) or when abandoning the well (Norsk Olje og Gass, 2008). 
Although the consequential aspects of the occurrence of a blow-out are severe, and hence leading to 
an increase in the overall risk level of performing well operations, the likelihood of experiencing a 
blow-out is not very high (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, 2010). However, this 
likelihood is rested on the foundation of the barrier system in place for keeping the well integrity. 
This barrier system is to a large degree dependent on human interaction and human decision-
making, and at times performed under stressful conditions for the decision-makers, entailing that the 
system is vulnerable against human error. The phenomena leading to situations where a blow-out 
could occur are not considered to be associated with a lot of scientific uncertainty, that is, there is a 
direct logical understanding of the underlying causes of a blow-out. Also, the mitigating measures 
and efforts undertaken by the companies to avoid blow-out situations contribute to minimizing the 
risks of having a blow-out. These measures include the use of a blow-out preventer (BOP) during the 
drilling of a well, safety valves in the well and on the rig/production platform, heavy drilling and 
completion fluid used to exceed the formation pressure and control the well fluids, use of explosion 
preventing equipment (Ex-equipment) and the emergency preparedness procedures. The measures 
include both pro-active and re-active measures, but their combinatory usage will lead to a reduction 
in the risk level. The case of treating the risks associated with a blow-out is a typical example of 
application of the ALARP-principle, in where the risks are to be reduced to a level that is as low as 
reasonably possible (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). This principle is often used when treating risks that 
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are considered to be acceptable, given the prerequisite that there are ways of reducing the risk level 
without incurring a cost that is disproportional to the effectiveness of the introduced measure. 
Hence, with the use of the ALARP-principle and the barrier system in place, the well operations are 
considered to be at an acceptable risk level. This risk level is of course also weighed up against the 
obvious benefits of performing the well operations, that is, increased revenue for the involved 
companies and the government. 
   
2.2.2.3 Personnel injuries and fatalities 
Injuries and fatalities for the personnel working offshore is a constant threat. The working 
environment and type of work performed on mobile drilling and production units offshore is 
considered to be particularly hazardous. The mobile offshore drilling- and production units are 
constantly moving, due to the prevailing wave and wind conditions. This hostile environment makes 
many activities very challenging, and a major source of risk for the involved personnel. There are not 
only risks involved with drilling for, and production of, highly ignitable reservoir fluids (e.g. risk of 
blow-outs, ref. chapter 0), but also other hazards such as: 
 Handling of heavy equipment, both manually and by use of automated machinery 
 On-loading and offloading equipment (cargo containers) from- and onto platform supply 
vessels (PSV) with deck cranes 
 Working in heights 
 Work on high-voltage electrical equipment 
 Working with toxic chemicals 
 Work with high-pressure systems 
 Working in cold and windy conditions 
 Transport to and from the offshore installations (primarily by helicopter) 
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There has been a significant change in both the philosophy and execution of safety related work 
offshore, since the start-up of the industry in the late 1960s. At the time, there was no common tool 
for describing or managing the risks involved (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). The government stated 
requirements for how to perform the activities within a satisfactory safety level, but these 
requirements were on detailed functional level, and probably not fit for purpose for raising the level 
of safety to the standard we expect today. The precautionary principle, which states that, when 
facing scientific uncertainty on the possible consequences of an activity, the activity should not be 
performed, was not a prevailing principle in the early days of the industry (see (Aven, 2008) and 
(Aven and Vinnem, 2007)). Due to the obvious large gains in increased welfare for the society as a 
whole, the benefits where considered to exceed the possible negative outcomes. It is difficult to rule 
the decisions made back then as careless, due to the fact that the knowledge, perspectives and 
decision criterion where different. However, it is reasonable to believe that many of the decisions 
and activities performed at that time would have taken a different form today. The case involving the 
North Sea pioneer divers is a good example of this (Government.no, 2014). The pioneer divers in the 
North Sea were an instrumental part in the development of many fields, before they were eventually 
relieved by remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) in more recent years. At the time, there was limited 
knowledge with regards to the safety issues with deep sea diving, and the long-term effects it had on 
the divers’ physical and mental health (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). In other words, there were large 
scientific uncertainties involved in the operations, which, by the precautionary principle, should 
imply that the activities should not be performed. However, due to the underlying economic 
incentives and the industry’s dependence on the contribution from the divers, the activities 
proceeded. The long-term effects of the diving operations, did, by natural reasons, not manifest 
themselves until years after the diving operations started. 
Every year since 2001, the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has published a report on the 
risk level connected with the total activity level on the NCS. The objective of the report is to 
(Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, 2013): 
 “Measure the effect of the HSE-work in the industry 
 Contribute in identifying critical areas for HSE and where additional efforts need prioritization 
in order to prevent undesirable incidents and accidents 
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 Increase the insight into possible causes of accidents and their relative significance for the risk 
picture, among other reasons to provide the industry and authorities with a better basis for 
decision making regarding preventive safety and emergency planning.”  
The background for publishing such a report was a discrepancy between the labour organizations and 
the oil companies on the true safety level of the operations performed (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). 
This necessitated the aid of an unbiased organization, a role which the PSA has taken. With regards 
to personnel injuries, the reports are showing an overall decreasing trend in serious injuries leading 
to medical treatment, absence from work into the next working shift, and fatalities from the years 
2002 – 2014. See Figure 6 below, which shows the number of serious personnel injuries per million 
worked hours on mobile offshore units between 2004 and 2014 on the NCS. The events reported 
include everything from small cuts needing stiches, to major accidents involving fatalities. Hence, the 
span of the different risk levels associated with the causes and consequences related to the reported 
events is rather wide. However, the graph is a decent manifestation of the development of the 
overall risk level exposure on the NCS.   
 
Figure 6: Serious personnel injuries per million worked hours from 2002 - 2014 (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, 
2014) 
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2.2.2.4 Equipment damage and failure 
In offshore operations, the equipment and tools needed to perform the different jobs are often 
highly specialized and unique for the task at hand. There are not many “off-the-shelf”- types of 
equipment, which increases the criticality of the role in performing as intended throughout the 
operation period. Damages to the equipment and subsequent equipment failure may not only have 
substantial economic consequences, but may also lead to injuries to personnel, environmental 
damages in the form of spills, and damages and failures to other affected equipment. The cost of 
equipment failure is usually not isolated to the cost of repair associated with bringing back the failed 
equipment to its functional state, but might also include costs associated with downtime on the rig, 
loss of production, damage repairs, fines, etc. It is evident that the consequential aspects of 
equipment failure cannot be viewed in isolation, and that they may carry negative outcomes that are 
unaccounted for. The causes of equipment damage may vary from improper use, e.g. exposing the 
equipment for overloads and not following procedure, to uncontrollable force majeure events.  
In the case of failure of critical equipment installed in a well, or on the sea bottom as with subsea 
installations, the costs involved with equipment retrieval, repair and re-installation may amount to 
tens of millions of dollars, and be extremely costly (Fanailoo and Andreassen, 2008). Not only will it 
hamper the production from the field, but it also necessitates the need of hiring an intervention 
vessel, e.g. a specialized intervention ship, or, if the job involves heavy intervention, a drilling rig. The 
capacity and availability of intervention vessels may not always be sufficient for the task, and the 
time frame of the downtime of production is further increased. An intervention operation also 
requires substantial planning efforts and is usually best performed during the summer months, due 
to the weather limitations of the operations. 
It is evident that increasing the equipment reliability is of the essence in reducing the risks of 
equipment failure. A method of improving the reliability, and upholding the functionality of the 
installed equipment and the tools used offshore, is by implementing maintenance strategies. There 
are in general four different strategies to choose from (Salim, 2012): 
 Corrective maintenance: A maintenance philosophy in where the equipment is only 
maintained post failure. The costs associated with having downtime due to failure is 
considered to be lower than the costs associated with performing preventive maintenance. 
 Preventive maintenance: Here, the company follows a fixed maintenance program 
according to certain time-intervals or according to other relevant criteria, such as time in 
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operation. The aim is to keep the functionality of the equipment at such a level that the risk 
of errors and faults are reduced. There is a balance to be struck between the cost of the 
maintenance program and the cost of downtime due to failure. 
 Condition-based maintenance: Bases itself on monitoring and registering the performance 
of the equipment or system, and prescribes the necessary maintenance based on the actual 
condition of the equipment. Different parameters of interest must be singled out and 
measured with the use of sensors. This philosophy ensures that no time is wasted on 
maintaining fully functional equipment, by registering an incipient fault before it actually 
occurs. It is important to keep in mind that the sensors and signal processing from the 
condition monitoring itself may induce uncertainty, as this equipment in itself do not 
possess 100% reliability. 
 Reliability centred maintenance: This maintenance strategy is based on the criticality of the 
equipment and the performance data. The criticality of the equipment may be identified 
through an FMECA. The aim of the strategy is to increase the overall performance of the 
equipment or system.    
A reliability analysis is an important tool for identifying and preparing strategies for the necessary 
maintenance and ensuring the functionality of the equipment and providing a solid basis for 
prioritizing between the different alternative solutions and actions. The petroleum industry has 
realized the importance of reliability analysis, and has made great development in the field over the 
years (Aven, 2006). Focus on reduced maintenance cost and increased efficiency has been one of the 
main drivers for this development. 
 
2.2.3 Operational risk 
Within the field of risk theory, where the realm of the risk concept is commonly divided into three 
separate types, operational risk is the part covering an organization’s risk exposure in the day-to-day 
operations (see chapter 2.2.1). As such, it covers a broad spectrum of situations, including (Aven, 
2008): 
 “Accidental events, including failures and defects, quality deviations and natural disasters; 
 Intentional acts – sabotage by disgruntled employees, fraud, and so on; 
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 Loss of competence, loss of key personnel; 
 Legal dispute associated with for instance defective contracts and third party claims” 
It is given that companies and organizations need to have proper risk management tools and 
procedures in place to mitigate the various risks they are exposed to in their daily operations. Within 
the different threats that fall into the categorization of operational risk, there are types of risk that 
are more or less controllable than others, i.e., they fall outside of the control sphere of the company. 
The essence of managing risk, and specifically with regards to operational risk, must on any account 
be focused on the robustness of the organization and its ability to handle the associated risks. 
According to DNV GL, the main purpose of managing operational risk is to (DNV GL, 2009): 
“…identify and understand potential risks, prevent loss, increase the ability of detecting signals that a 
risky and unwanted event or situation is about to occur, in addition to establishing measures for 
handling the potential consequences of such events.” 
In this statement, there are elements of both preventive and corrective nature, as the focus is both 
on the causal and consequential aspects of risk, in accordance with other views on risk management 
(see chapter 2.2.1). It is evident that possessing an understanding of the various conditions affecting 
the performance of the operations is vital for any organization. Reducing the scientific uncertainties 
and increasing the knowledge of the threats and opportunities of the operations, in correspondence 
with use of the ALARP-principle, appear to be a proper mean of reducing operational risk. Well 
implemented internal operating procedures and thorough risk analyses processes are tools that will 
contribute to this matter.   
There are a number of different definitions of operational risk, many of whom are constructed for 
use in financial contexts. However, the ruling principle and meaning of the definitions can be related 
to other aspects as well, such as the general conditions listed above. The methodology of an 
investment bank for handling operational risk may not be too different from that of an oil- or service 
company.  
It is a common misunderstanding that operational risk is to be understood as a concept, or term, 
covering the types of risks that do not fall within the other main categories of financial- or strategic 
risk. In other words, operational risk is commonly seen as some sort of residue risk. However, 
operational risk should not be reduced to some concept that falls between the chairs of seemingly 
more important types of risk. Operational risk is elevated to a higher level of abstraction, by including 
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risks that are difficult to substantiate by mere quantitative efforts, such as intentional acts, loss of 
competence and quality deviations (ibid.).        
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which is a financial organization where over 60 central 
banks from all over the world are members, organizes the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), which is a forum for establishing global standards and regulations for banks, with the 
intention of ensuring financial stability and reducing risk exposure (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2015). The BCBS, through its Basel II accord, defines operational risk in the following 
manner (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001): 
“The risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events.” 
It is further stated that strategic- and reputational risk is not included in the definition. This definition 
of operational risk touches base with some relevant aspects of the term, but it has got some weak 
spots. The use of the word “risk” in the definition can be considered to be problematic, as the 
definition then becomes somewhat of a circular definition. If the aim is to define the term 
“operational risk”, there should be a clear statement in the definition of what is meant by the term 
“risk”, as this is also a concept which carries various interpretations. Operational risk is an under-
grouping of the wider term risk, and a definition of the former cannot be meaningful without also 
declaring the definition of the latter. Another weakness of the definition is its perceived attempt at 
quantifying risk, i.e. assigning objective characteristics to risk (DNV GL, 2009). This specifically refers 
to the losses, direct or indirect, resulting from “…inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events”. For instance, it is often challenging to quantify the losses related to 
human error and inadequacies.  Such quantifications would inherently be characterised by 
substantial uncertainties that are not captured by the definition as it is formed. At last, the definition 
fails to treat the intrinsic positive value of risk, which is opportunity (Aven, 2008). Opportunity is here 
understood as the flexibility offered by different alternatives, through a range of consequences 
following an event. Within many definitions of risk, where uncertainty forms the main component, 
the opportunity dimension is usually included, see (Aven, 2010). The rationale behind this is that 
when being exposed to risk, through the performance of an activity, there is always an element of 
opportunity, i.e. positive outcome, included in the range of consequential aspects of the activity. 
That is, after all, the whole reason for wanting to perform the activity in the first place.  
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The lack of a proper treatment of uncertainty in the definition of operational risk from the BCBS, in 
addition to the other objections stated above, renders it inadequate for use in a context for 
managing operational risk in offshore service contracts. There will not be any attempts of forming a 
definition of the term operational risk in this report. However, the term is to be understood as a sub-
category of the wider term risk, concerning uncertainty-based risk exposure in the day-to-day 
activities, operations and performance of an organization or business. Here, the term risk is defined 
and understood as stated earlier in this chapter, i.e. (Aven, 2010): 
“By risk we understand the two-dimensional combination of 
i. events A and the consequences of these events C, and 
ii. the associated uncertainties U (whether A will occur and what value C will take).” 
This definition incorporates both the causal and the consequential aspects of risk, in addition to 
including the associated uncertainties, which are prevalent in all manners where risk is present.        
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3 METHOD 
When conducting a research or illuminating a topic of interest the choice of method is utterly 
important. Presenting the chosen method will also make sure that the reader can verify the findings 
of the report and attempt to reproduce the results. Choosing a method is much like selecting tools 
when performing a job, and making the right selection of tools will ensure that the job is performed 
in the most efficient and safe manner. This chapter will present the choice of method for this report, 
and why this method was chosen. Some general entries on methods will also be presented. 
 
3.1 Research strategy 
There are several means of conducting research, and the methods available can often be 
complementary to each other. It is a common misconception that there is but one methodology that 
is the correct one for each individual research, and that all other methods must then be put aside 
(Yin, 2003). Rather, the different research methods have their strengths and weaknesses which may 
be combined and exploited in order to obtain the goals of the research. According to Yin (2003), the 
selection of research strategies are: 
Strategy 
Form of Research 
Question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioural Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary Events? 
Experiment How, why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many, how much? 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, 
how many, how much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, why? No No 
Case Study How, why? No Yes 
Table 1: Properties of the different research strategies (Yin, 2003) 
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When choosing the method for this report, the most appropriate choice seemed to be a case study. 
The hypothesis and following research questions stated in chapter 1, carry more emphasis towards 
“How” and “Why” than the other key words such as “How much” and “How many”. The essence of 
the report is investigating how well operational risk is implemented and shared in contracts between 
the Service Company and its clients. It is thus more suitable for a qualitative approach. Although the 
research questions stated in chapter 1 are of the “what”-type, they are merely supportive and 
provide a backdrop for understanding the main hypothesis. There are generally two types of “What”-
questions, the first type is more exploratory and fit for any of the five strategies, while the second is 
more about prevalence and favourable in research of archival records and surveys (ibid.). In the case 
of this report, the “what”-nature of the research questions are clearly more exploratory than 
prevalent.  
There are obvious limitations to the possible control that can be exerted over the behavioural events. 
The centre of attention will be the written contracts between the Service Company and its clients, 
and these are firmly fixed and out of reach for manipulation. This excludes the experiment as a 
relevant strategy for the chosen method. The case study and the history strategy share many 
attributes, but the case study adds two more sources of evidence which may not always be included 
in the latter strategy. These sources are direct observation of the events, or situation being studied, 
and interviews of persons who were, or are, involved in the events (ibid.). The ability of the case 
study to handle contemporary events, and utilize supporting material such as documents, interviews 
and observations makes it the most fitting strategy for this report. For this report, both direct 
observations, interviews with relevant personnel and access to contracts are possible. 
According to Yin (2003), the definition of a case study is two-folded, where the first part describes 
the scope of a case study, and the second describes the characteristics of a case study. The case 
study is accordingly defined as: 
1. “A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
2. The case study enquiry 
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 copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables 
of interest than data points, and as one result 
 relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion, and as another result 
 benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection 
and analysis.” 
The case study has received criticism for being the weaker method in some scientific communities. 
The critics regard the case study to be imprecise and only appropriate in the initial exploratory 
phases of a research and not as a stand-alone strategy (ibid.). However, the case study is also a 
widely accepted method for situations such as the one applying for this report. There are certainly 
drawbacks with performing qualitative scientific research, but they may be avoided with the proper 
set-up. A proper evaluation and presentation of the available information, and keeping within the 
frames of the relevant theory, will ensure a thorough investigation of the hypothesis. 
  
3.2 Research design 
The research design is, in general terms, “a logical plan for getting from here to there” (Yin, 2003). In 
other words, it is the way of getting from an initial set of questions, or hypothesis and research 
questions in the case of this report, to some sort of conclusion. The important part in the middle, 
from raising the question to drawing the conclusion, is collection and analysis of relevant information 
and data. The documentation of the work performed and the various sources collected is vital for the 
transparency of the analysis, and the enablement of reproduction of the case study. According to Yin 
(2003), there are mainly four types of design that can be chosen. The different types of design may 
be incorporated into a 2x2 matrix. See Figure 7 below for an overview. The main distinction is 
between choosing a single- or a multiple-case design. The conditions for choosing the former, is 
when the case represents (ibid.): 
 “A critical test of existing theory; 
 A rare or unique circumstance; 
 A representative or typical case, or when the case serves a; 
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o Revelatory, or; 
o Longitudinal purpose.” 
A single-case design, may also incorporate several analyses. These added analyses may shed valuable 
light on the case study, but the question of relevance must be taken into consideration. If the other 
analyses are of a slightly different nature, then the whole research may drift off its intended course. 
The multiple-case design is more time-consuming and demands more experience with performing 
case studies. One must be able to replicate the conditions underlying each case study, and each case 
must therefore be carefully selected. However, when given the choice and opportunity, the multiple-
case design should be preferred to the single-case design. The multiple-case design is generally 
considered more robust, as the design enables the investigator to conduct research and collect 
information from more sources than with single-case design (ibid.).    
 
Figure 7: Four different design types for case studies (Yin, 2003) 
 
Given the lack of time and resources for conducting multiple-case studies, the choice of design for 
this report is a single-case design. However, to increase the amount of data and the significance of 
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the findings, analyses of two different contracts will be conducted, i.e. two analyses in one case-
design. As such, the choice of case design will be of Type 2. This should give the report a sufficient 
amount of background knowledge for presenting a conclusion to the hypothesis, although additional 
analyses would be more preferable. 
 
3.3 The Case 
The case in this report is based on investigating how operational risk is implemented and shared in 
contracts between the Service Company and its clients. That implies that two contracts will be 
investigated, to give the case a more solid foundation than if only a single contract was being 
analysed.  
The Service Company has granted access to the full portfolio of contracts, and there are but few 
limitations to which contracts that are available for scrutiny. Such limitations are applicable in 
contracts where the Service Company and the client are in dispute, and thus require discretion. This 
implies that the contract is off limit for third party insight. There are however still numerous of other 
contracts that are applicable for selection, which should give the case study enough material. 
The chosen contracts will be carefully analysed in a qualitative manner, and their implementation of, 
or lack of, operational risk will be highlighted. The contents of operational risk in the contracts will 
then be tied to the presented theory in this report. This work will be supported by the report 
supervisor, and other resources and personnel working at the Service Company, so that any 
vagueness in the contracts or questions arising during the performance of the analyses can be 
clarified. 
According to Yin (2003), there are six sources of evidence when working on a case study. See Table 2 
below for strengths and weaknesses of the six different sources. 
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Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation 
 Stable – can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
 Unobtrusive – not created as 
a result of the case study 
 Broad coverage – long span 
of time, many events, and 
many settings 
 Retrievability – can be low 
 Biased selectivity, if 
collection is incomplete 
 Reporting bias – reflects 
(unknown) bias of authority 
 Access – may be deliberately 
blocked 
Archival Records 
 [same as above for 
documentation] 
 Precise and quantitative 
 [same as above for 
documentation] 
 Accessibility due to privacy 
reasons 
Interviews 
 Targeted – focuses directly 
on case study topic 
 Insightful – provided 
perceived casual inferences 
 Bias due to poorly 
constructed questions 
 Response bias 
 Inaccuracies due to poor 
recall 
 Reflexivity – interviewee 
gives what interviewer wants 
to hear 
Direct Observations 
 Reality – covers events in 
real time 
 Contextual – covers context 
of event 
 Time-consuming 
 Selectivity – unless broad 
coverage 
 Reflexivity – event may 
proceed differently because 
it is being observed 
 Cost-hours needed by human 
observers 
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Participant Observations 
 [same as above for direct 
observation] 
 Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives 
 [same as above for direct 
observations] 
 Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation of events 
Physical Artifacts 
 Insightful into cultural 
features 
 Insightful into technical 
operations 
 Selectivity 
 Availability 
Table 2: Strengths and weaknesses of different sources of case study evidence (Yin, 2003) 
 
The sources of evidence that are available for the case study performed in this report are 
documentation, in the form of the written contracts, and interviews of key personnel involved in the 
contract management at the Service Company. Note that performing interviews will merely be an 
optional choice, should the interpretation of the contracts need further emphasis. The primary 
source of evidence will be the written contracts. Documentation as a source of evidence may have a 
weakness in that it may be altered in retrospect of its creation, or created for a time and audience 
that do not serve the purpose of enlightening the case study (ibid.). However, this is not the case 
here. The written contracts in question here, are assumed to be in their original state, as agreed by 
the two parties. And except for later added amendments to the contracts, they are unaltered. Any 
amendments to the contracts are also available for analysis. 
 
3.4 Evaluation of the documentation 
In case studies, it is a great advantage to be able to use multiple sources of evidence, as this will 
strengthen any findings in the study. However, in this report, the contracts are but the only source of 
evidence available for investigating their contents with regards to operational risk. As mentioned, 
there are opportunities to perform interviews with contract management personnel, but that might 
introduce additional subjectivity into the interpretations of the contents of the contract. The 
interviews, as an option, will however function as a supplementary source of evidence, should that 
be needed. In the following sub-chapters, the issues of reliability and validity of the documentation 
will be dealt with. 
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3.4.1 Reliability 
Reliability is a matter of being able to produce the same results from the same material, by different 
investigators. This means that if one investigator, following the same procedures as the one before 
him, conducted the same case study, should get to the same conclusions to the same initial 
questions (Yin, 2003). That implies that in order for the case study to be reliable, the applied 
methods, theory and procedures, in addition to the evidence, must be declared in the background 
material.  
In this qualitative case study, the biggest problem encountered will be that of subjective 
interpretations of the contents and formulation of the contracts. This is something that is difficult to 
overcome, and it certainly adds an extra emphasis on having a proper methodology of the work. 
Also, a clear statement of the investigator’s interpretation of keywords in both the report and the 
contract is necessary. Due to considerations of discretion and privacy, the participants in the 
examined contracts need to be anonymous, and the contents of the contracts must be carefully 
mediated so as not to reveal any confidential information, explicitly or “in between the lines”. 
Although this may form a somewhat obscured image of the evidence, it is still possible to extract 
valuable information and use that in the study, as the essential keywords are, to a high degree, 
generic and not contract- or company-specific. 
The contracts made available for the investigator, i.e. the author of this report, are by reasons stated 
above, not available for the general public or third party review, without granted consent. This 
affects the reliability of the case study in a negative way, as the reader may not possess or have 
access to the background material, but it is unfortunately the only means of performing the work. 
Another element that should be mentioned, that could have potential effect on the reliability of the 
study, is the author’s connection with the Service Company. Being fully employed by the Service 
Company may alter the author’s motives and challenge the objectivity needed. There is a risk of 
giving an ill-founded weight to positive findings in the analysis, and vice versa, to not sufficiently 
document negative findings. However, the author’s position is within a different department than 
the one dealing with contract management and the ties with that department has been established 
in connection with the report only. On this account, the author should have a sufficient distance to 
obtain the needed objectivity. It is however important to disclose these issues here. 
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3.4.2 Validity 
Validity in this context is a question of relevance, that is, how relevant the collected information is 
for the purpose of reaching a conclusion to the stated hypothesis. Yin (2003) distinguishes between 
internal and external validity. Internal validity is understood as the causal relationships created 
between factors in a study, that is, the underlying causes leading to the observed consequences. 
However, internal validity is only relevant for explanatory studies. External validity, on the other 
hand, is understood as the relevance of the findings in the isolated study, to the general domain of 
which the object of interest belongs to. The external validity of the case study in this report is very 
important. The question is: can the findings in this report be generalized and relevant for other 
contractual relationships as well? The answer to that is a conditional yes. Conditional in the sense 
that the other contracts are in the same standardized format as the contracts investigated in this 
report. In most cases they will be. However, the contracting parties may choose to include exhibits 
where particularities are stated, in which case the external validity of the report would be 
undermined. The reader should be aware of this. 
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4. ANALYSIS 
The following chapter will present two different contracts between the Service Company and two 
different customers, or petroleum field operators. The contents of the contracts, which are 
considered relevant for the topic of this report, are included and commented upon. The two 
contracts are presented in two separate sub-chapters, and are denoted as Contract 1 and Contract 2 
for purpose of anonymity. 
To ensure a common reference and tool for the analysis work on the two contracts, they are 
interpreted in the light of the standard contract formats, such as the mentioned NSC 05, NTK 07 and 
NF 07. These formats include a standard formulation of the conditions of contract, and given that 
they are developed in joint effort by various service- and operator companies, they are assumed to 
ensure a fair division of obligations and responsibilities, and to be in compliance with Norwegian laws 
and regulations. The contract exhibits, which are specific for the respective contracts, are presented 
by their own account. 
Throughout the analysis of the contracts, the findings will be reflected in the light of relevant and 
presented theory. 
     
4.1 Analysis of Contract 1 
In the following, Contract 1 is presented and analysed. The contract is a frame agreement between 
the Service Company and a field operator, regarding delivery of a subsea system for a particular field 
on the NCS. The field operator is a major company, and is involved in a great amount of fields on the 
NCS, both as operator and partner in various license groups. The parties also co-operate on other 
projects, making the frame agreement one of several other contracts between the two. The contract, 
or frame agreement, was formed in the beginning of the 2000s.  
For the sake of simplicity, “the Contractor” is to be understood as “the Service Company” and “the 
Company” is to be understood as “the field operator”, or “customer” of the Service Company, in the 
following text, in accordance with the terminology in Contract 1. The chapter is further divided into 
two sub-chapters, the first (chapter 4.1.1) concentrating on contents of operational risk within the 
conditions of contract in Contract 1, and the second (chapter 4.1.2) dedicated to searching for 
contents of operational risk within the various exhibits in Contract 1.  
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It is natural to begin by comparing the main parts of the three standard contract formats of NTK 07, 
NF 07 and NSC 05 with that of Contract 1. As can be seen from Table 3 below, the standard contract 
formats share, for the most part, the same main contents. This is not surprising, as the contract 
formats are developed in the same time period, and by many of the same participants. As Contract 1 
is also formed within the same time period, it is only natural that this also follows the same build-up. 
Part NTK 07 NF 07 NSC 05 Contract 1 
I General provisions General provisions General provisions General provisions 
II Performance of the 
work 
Performance of the 
work 
Performance of 
the work 
Performance of 
the work 
III Progress of the work Progress of the work Progress of the 
work 
Progress of the 
work 
IV Variations, cancellation 
and suspension 
Variations, cancellation 
and suspension 
Variations and 
cancellation 
Variations and 
cancellation 
V Delivery and payment Delivery and payment Delivery and 
payment 
Delivery and 
payment 
VI Breach of contract Breach of contract Breach of contract Breach of contract 
VII Force majeure Force majeure Force majeure Force majeure 
VIII Liability and insurances Liability and insurances Liability and 
insurances 
Liability and 
insurances 
IX Limitation and exclusion 
of liability 
Limitation and exclusion 
of liability 
Proprietary rights, 
etc. 
Proprietary rights, 
etc. 
X Proprietary rights etc. Proprietary rights etc. Other provisions Other provisions 
XI Other provisions Other provisions   
Table 3: Comparison of the main parts of Contract 1 with the main parts of the standard contract formats (Norsk Industri, 
2007b), (Norsk Industri, 2007a) and (Norsk Olje & Gass, 2005) 
 
Contract 1 appears to follow the same structure as that of NSC 05, as it structures the main parts in 
the very same way. Also, since the contract is concerning a subsea field development, it would be 
natural to turn to NSC 05 as the reference contract format. However, when looking more closely into 
the articles included in NSC 05 and Contract 1, there are differences between them. See Table 4 
below for a comparison of the main parts and articles of NSC 05 and Contract 1. 
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Part NSC 05 Part Contract 1 
I GENERAL PROVISIONS I GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Art.1 Definitions Art.1 Definitions 
Art.2 Contract documents – interpretation Art.2 Contract documents – interpretation 
Art.3 Representatives of the parties Art.3 Terms and intention of the Contract 
II PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK Art.4 Work Order 
Art.4 Obligations of Contractor and Company 
– main rules 
Art.5 Representatives of the parties 
Art.5 Authority requirements – permits II PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK 
Art.6 Drawings and specifications – Company 
Provided Items  
Art.6 Obligations of Contractor – main rules 
Art.7 Subcontracts Art.7 Subcontracts 
Art.8 Contractor Personnel Art.8 Personnel 
Art.9 The Spread Art.9 Quality assurance 
Art.10 Quality assurance and health, safety and 
environment 
Art.10 Safety, health and working environment 
III PROGRESS OF THE WORK III PROGRESS OF THE WORK 
Art.11 Contract Schedule – delayed progress Art.11 Contract Schedule – delayed progress 
IV VARIATIONS AND CANCELLATION IV VARIATIONS AND CANCELLATION 
Art.12 Right to vary the Work Art.12 Right to vary the Work 
Art.13 Effects of Variation to the Work Art.13 Effects of Variation to the Work 
Art.14 Issue of Variation Orders Art.14 Issue of Variation Orders 
Art.15 Consequences of variation orders – 
disputes about consequences 
Art.15 Consequences of variation orders – 
disputes about consequences 
Art.16 Dispute as to whether a variation to the 
work exists – disputed variation order 
Art.16 Dispute as to whether a variation to the 
work exists – disputed variation order 
Art.17 Cancellation Art.17 Cancellation 
Art.18 Company’s right to temporarily suspend 
the Work. 
Art.18 Company’s right to temporarily suspend 
the Work. 
V DELIVERY AND PAYMENT V DELIVERY AND PAYMENT 
Art.19 Delivery and Completion of the Work Art.19 Delivery and Completion of the Work 
Art.20 Payment, invoicing and audit Art.20 Payment, invoicing and audit 
Art.21 Security for Company’s claims Art.21 Security for Company’s claims 
Art.22 Title – right to demand delivery Art.22 Title  
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Art.23 Contractor’s guarantee – acceptance 
certificate 
Art.23 Contractor guarantee  
VI BREACH OF CONTRACT VI BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Art.24 Contractor’s delay Art.24 Default and delay 
Art.25 Contractor’s defects and guarantee 
liability 
Art.25 Contractor’s defects and guarantee 
liability 
Art.26 Termination due to Contractor’s breach 
of Contract 
Art.26 Suspension or termination due to 
Contractor’s breach of Contract 
Art.27 Company’s breach of Contract Art.27 Company’s breach of Contract 
VII FORCE MAJEURE VII FORCE MAJEURE 
Art.28 Effects of Force Majeure Art.28 Effects of Force Majeure 
VIII LIABILITY AND INSURANCES VIII LIABILITY AND INSURANCES 
Art.29 Loss or damage to the Contract Object 
or Company Provided Items 
Art.29 Loss of or damage to Company Provided 
Items 
Art.30 Exclusion of liability – indemnification Art.30 Liability – Indemnification 
Art.31 Insurance Art.31 Insurances 
IX PROPRIETARY RIGHTS, ETC. IX PROPRIETARY RIGHTS, ETC. 
Art.32 Rights to information, technology and 
inventions 
Art.32 Rights to documents and computer 
programs 
Art.33 Confidential information Art.33 Inventions 
X OTHER PROVISIONS Art.34 Confidential Information 
Art.34 Limitation and exclusion of liability X OTHER PROVISIONS 
Art.35 Assignment – mortgage Art.35 Assignment of the Contract, etc. 
Art.36 Notices Art.36 Notices 
Art.37 Norwegian law and disputes Art.37 Norwegian law and disputes 
Table 4: Comparison of the main parts and the articles of Contract 1 and NSC 05 (Norsk Olje & Gass, 2005) 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, there are some differences between the contents of the standard NSC 
05 and Contract 1, although Contract 1 is largely built on the foundations laid by the standard format. 
Some terms that are found in one article in NSC 05, may be found in a different article (under a 
different heading) in Contract 1. On this account, one must take care when comparing the articles 
against each other.  
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4.1.1 Comparison between Contract 1 and NSC 05 
Similarities and differences between the conditions of contract in NSC 05 and Contract 1, found in 
the respective articles, are listed below. The similarities and differences stated may carry a degree of 
importance which may vary from little to highly relevant for the topic of this report, i.e. division and 
implementation of operational risk. The less relevant findings are stated for the curiosity of, and, 
added perspective for the reader. On the other hand, the more relevant findings are supplemented 
with and followed by a comment, to highlight and tie the findings to the presented theory.       
 Both NSC 05 and Contract 1 contain the same exhibits, apart from Contract 1 not including 
Exhibit I – Company’s Insurances. 
Comment: This leaves out the Company’s obligations towards the Contractor under the Contract to 
ensure that sufficient insurances are obtained in relation to the project. Contrary, the Contractor is 
obliged to obtain insurances under article 31. This represents an imbalance in the requirements for 
the parties.       
 Contract 1 prescribes a different order of prioritization than NSC 05, should the contents of 
the contract documents be in conflict with each other. Contract 1 prioritizes in the following 
order: 
a. Specific part of Conditions of Contract (Appendix CoC1), 
b. these Conditions of Contract 
c. specific Work Orders, 
d. all Exhibits, except Exhibit D, in the order they are listed as aforementioned in 
Art.2.1, 
e. Exhibit D. 
The specific Work Orders refer to projects that are issued as a part of the frame agreement. 
 Article 6 – Obligations of Contractor – main rules in Contract 1, fails to also include the 
obligations of the Company, as it is done in Article 4 – Obligations of Contractor and 
Company – main rules in NSC 05. 
Comment: This might seem like a trivial omission, but it leaves an impression of being a contract that 
is one sided, as opposed to being bilateral.    
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 There are no instructions as to what the Company is obliged to do in the event where 
“errors” are found in the Company Provided Items (see Art.6.7 in Contract 1), as stated in 
Art.6.4 in NSC 05. 
Comment: This may lead to unnecessary time delays and incurred costs in correcting the errors and 
delegating the responsibilities for performing the corrections. The Company is the best suited at 
controlling the risk of errors in the Company Provided Items, and it should be stated as such in the 
contract, as it is in NSC 05.   
 Article 7 – Subcontracts is almost formulated the same way in both Contract 1 and NSC 05, 
where the Contractor needs to obtain the permission of the Company in order to acquire the 
services of a subcontractor. It is further stated in Article 7.2 that the Contractor is responsible 
for the fulfilment of any Subcontracts in accordance with the Contract. 
Comment: Assignment of subcontracts of parts of the Work induces the risk of interface 
management problems, which are not very well described in Contract 1, nor in NSC 05. Complex 
deliveries, such as a subsea system, will most likely involve the contribution of several sub-
contractors. Some sort of declaration of the division of responsibilities and liabilities between the 
various sub-contractors involved in the Work is missing here.        
 Article 8– Personnel in Contract 1, contains formulations regarding the Company’s rights to 
approve personnel performing Work under the Contract. It states that the Company reserves 
the right to approve all personnel performing Work under the Contract, and also the right to 
replace previously approved personnel. Also, the Contractor is, upon the Company’s request, 
obliged to provide details regarding the qualifications of its personnel provided to Company 
for performance of the Work. This formulation is not included in the NSC 05, nor the NF 07 or 
NTK 07. 
Comment: This may be considered to be somewhat of an overstepping of the boundaries between 
the two contracting parties, as the Company appears not to fully entrust the Contractor to ensure 
the quality and competence of its own personnel. However, it is understandable, at least from the 
Company’s point of view that they want to retain some control over the key personnel involved in 
the project under the Contract. Loss of key personnel is an essential operational risk, a risk that 
appears to be sufficiently addressed in article 8 in Contract 1.   
 The Spread is not mentioned in Contract 1, as in NSC 05. 
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Comment: The Spread is an essential part of the items provided by the Contractor, and as discussed 
in chapter 2.2.2.4, equipment damage and failures constitute a significant contribution to the overall 
level of operational risk in the performance of the Work in accordance with the Contract. As such, 
provisions regarding the Spread should be granted attention in Contract 1, as it is in NSC 05.    
 Art.13.1 in NSC 05 states: 
“All obligations under the Contract apply to Variations to the Work, unless otherwise agreed.”  
This is term is formulated differently in Contract 1, where it is stated: 
“All Contractor’s obligations under the Contract/Work Order also apply to variation work, 
unless otherwise agreed.” 
Comment: This specification and explicit mentioning of one of the parties, i.e. the Contractor, 
highlights a weighing of obligations against the Contractor. Nothing is mentioned of the Company’s 
obligations under the Contract/Work Order when Variations to Work are issued. This asymmetry 
might be considered trivial, but may gain importance should conflict arise between the parties.  
 Art.17 – Cancellation is stricter on the Company in NSC 05 than in Contract 1. In addition to 
remuneration of work already performed and expenses incurred with purchases of relevant 
material, the Contractor is entitled to a certain cancellation fee according to Art.17.3 in NSC 
05. The Contractor is also entitled to compensation according to a percentage of the 
unearned portion of the Contract Price should the Contract be cancelled within 180 days 
prior to planned Mobilization. This is not included in Art.17 in Contract 1. 
It is worth noting that the further treatment of the Contract Object, materials and other 
important terms related to cancelling the Contract are not mentioned in Contract 1, as in 
NSC 05.  
Comment: This increases the risk of conflict between the parties, should a cancellation occur. The 
risk of cancellation is particularly present in long-term frame agreements such as this.  
 In Contract 1, there are no time limitations for the Company to dispute the proposal for the 
final account for the Work Order, as there is in Art.20.4 in NSC 05, where the Company is 
given 90 days to dispute the proposal. 
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 Art.20.4 in Contract 1 does not give the right of the Contractor to get an audit from a neutral 
third party, as it is given in Art.20.5 of the NSC 05. 
 According to Article 21 – Security for Company’s claims in Contract 1, the guarantee after 
issuance of the Completion Certificate is only at 30% of the initial guarantee amount, as 
opposed to a required 50% in the NSC 05 (see Art.21.2). 
Comment: This holds the Contractor liable for a much smaller amount during the guarantee period, 
and must be said to be fair in favour of the Contractor. Upon issuance of the Completion Certificate, 
and at the start of the Guarantee Period, the Company is the party that is the better suited at 
controlling the risk of the Contract Object, as the Company then takes the Contract Object into use. 
However, it is important that the Contractor is able to answer to the performance of the Contract 
Object during the guarantee period, and if not, that it is able to guarantee the Company 
compensation.    
 Art.23 - Contractor Guarantee is in line in both Contract 1 and NSC 05. 
 Art.24 – Contractor’s Delay in NSC 05, states the Company’s right of having the Contract 
Object handed over for completion by another contractor. Art.24 - Default and delay in 
Contract 1 does not include such a clause. 
 Art.25 – Contractor’s Defects and Guarantee Liability in Contract 1 does not include the 
Company’s obligations of swift notification to the Contractor should a defect exists. In Art.25 
– Contractor’s Defects and Guarantee Liability in NSC 05, the Contractor is liable for defects 
only if the Company has given notice of the defect, without undue delay after having 
discovered the defect, or after having ought to discovered the defect. 
Comment: Such a formulation (as stated in Art. 25 in NSC 05) is common in trading legislation, and 
clearly states the buyer’s, i.e. Company’s, responsibility of testing and examining the Contract Object 
upon deliverance, when the risk of the Contract Object is transferred to the Company.  
Also, in Contract 1, there is a clause saying that if the Company decides that the rectification 
work for a defect discovered during the Guarantee Period cannot be performed during the 
Guarantee Period, then the Contractor’s obligation to remedy the defect shall apply for a 
period of 3 years from the issuance of the Completion Certificate. In such event, the 
Contractor shall not be responsible for any additional cost occurring as a consequence of 
expansion of the defect due to the delayed rectification.   
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In NSC 05, there is an upper limit of the Contractor’s liabilities of rectification work and for 
damages according to Art.25.4 of up to 15% of the Contract Price. No such upper limit is 
mentioned in Art.25 in Contract 1. There, the Contractor is, however, not liable for costs 
related to “…extra costs associated with Guarantee Work performed below the water line 
exceeding NOK 1.000.000 per Work Order.” 
Comment: Such a limitation to work performed below the water line presents a very important 
shield for the Contractor, as the risk of equipment failure and damage, pollution, etc., is then to a 
large extent carried by the Company. Being fully liable for rectification work below the water line 
would constitute a major contribution to the overall operational risk level carried by the Contractor, 
and by the introduction of an upper limit, the Company absorbs a fair part of this risk.  
 Art.26 – Termination due to Contractor’s Breach of Contract in NSC 05 puts a lot of attention 
to the performance of the Spread (i.e. vessels, barges, equipment and personnel involved in 
performing the Work), whereas Contract 1 does not mention the Spread at all. This gives 
Art.26 in Contract 1 a somewhat different content than that in NSC 05. However, the 
message is the same. 
Comment: As stated before, the lack of implementation of the Spread in Contract 1, could prove to 
be problematic, as the performance of the Spread is an essential part of the Work.    
An important clause is added in Contract 1, stating that the total liability under each Work Order shall 
be limited to 100% of the Compensation under the respective Work Order. This is in favour of the 
Contractor, as the potential damages and costs involved with a Contract Termination may be 
substantial for both parties. 
 In Art.27 – Company’s Breach of Contract, the right of the Contractor to suspend the Work or 
terminate the Contract due to the Company’s substantial breach of its payment obligations is 
not included in Contract 1, as in NSC 05. 
Comment: This presents a disadvantage for the Contractor, as he does not possess the option of 
suspending or terminating the Work, or parts thereof, a privilege that is solely the Company’s. This 
asymmetry must be considered to be unfair, although one must assume that the Contractor is 
protected by the ruling legislation (“Avtaleloven”), should the Company be substantial breach of the 
terms of the Contract. 
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 In Art.28 – Effects of Force Majeure in Contract 1, both parties have the right to cancel the 
Contract or the respective Work Order if the Force Majeure situation lasts without 
interruption for 60 days or more. In Art.28 of NSC 05, the Contractor must wait 180 days for 
this right, while the Company has the right after 60 days. 
Comment: This presents a potentially valuable option (which in itself carries a value) for both the 
Contractor and the Company. 
 Art.29 – Loss of or damage to Company Provided Items, states that the Contractor is obliged 
to carry out measures to complete the Work in accordance with the Contract, even if loss or 
damage to Company Provided Items situated under Contractor Group’s safekeeping and 
control is caused by negligence shown by the Company Group. The same term is stated in 
Art.29 – Loss or damage to Contract Object or Company Provided Items in NSC 05. 
Comment: This provision is included to ensure the continuity of the Work, and to avoid hindrance of 
the Work due to time consuming and costly disputes between the contracting parties. 
 Art.30 – Liability – Indemnification in Contract 1 states that the Contractor shall indemnify 
the Company Group from any claims concerning loss or damage suffered by anyone other 
than Contractor Group or Company Group (e.g. third party companies, government, etc.). 
The same obligation applies for the Company, i.e. the Company shall indemnify the 
Contractor against claims concerning loss or damage suffered by a third party.  
The Contractor’s liability, in cases where a third party has suffered a loss and claim 
compensation for damages is however limited to NOK 5.000.000 in both NSC 05 and Contract 
1. The limitations applying for the Company is not stated, if any exists at all. 
Comment: This limitation of liability is important for the Contractor, as it reduces the uncertainty 
related to the Contractor’s obligations towards compensation for third party claims. As mentioned 
before, offshore operations involve numerous of sub-contractors and stakeholders (i.e. third parties), 
and the potential for conflict in the wake of accidents is always present.   
 Art.31 – Insurances in Contract 1 does not mention any demands towards the insurances the 
Company must provide and maintain, as it does in NSC 05, where the Company is obliged to 
have a construction all risk-, transport and liability-insurance (up to NOK 500 million). Nor 
does it specify which types of insurances are needed by the Contractor, other than that the 
Contractor shall insure its liability under the Contract. Such specifications are included in NSC 
05. 
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Art.31 in Contract 1 also includes a clause stating that the insurance policy shall be taken out 
with first class insurers and according to the best insurance terms available in the market. 
The NSC 05 does not dictate such a principle. 
Comment: Again, this presents a provision which is only applicable for one of the parties, i.e. the 
Contractor.  
 The parties’ indemnification of each other with regard to indirect losses, are not included in 
Contract 1, as in Art.34 – Limitation and exclusion of liability in NSC 05. 
Comment: Such indirect losses include loss of profit and or earnings, loss due to pollution and loss of 
production, which in the case of offshore production, may be sizeable. The division of the risk for 
suffering indirect losses are therefore appears to be an unsolved matter in Contract 1. However, Art. 
30 – Liability - indemnification in Contract 1 indemnifies the parties of all consequential losses 
suffered by each other. This may be interpreted to cover indirect losses as well.   
Art.34 in NSC 05 also states the maximum total liability of the Contractor’s Breach of 
Contract, which amounts to 25% of the Contract Price. Such a limitation is not stated in 
Contract 1, other than the limitation stated in Art.26 – Suspension or termination due to 
Contractor’s breach of Contract. Here the Contractor’s total liability under each Work Order 
is limited to 100% of the Compensation under the respective Work Order.  
Comment: Although there is a significant difference between being liable for 25% of the Contract 
Price (according to NSC 05) and 100% of the compensation under each Work Order (according to 
Contract 1), one should keep in mind that a full contract will most often carry a lot more value than a 
single work order. Hence, the total liability of the Contractor may actually be less under Contract 1 
than under NSC 05. 
 Both Contract 1 and NSC 05 are governed by and interpreted in accordance with Norwegian 
law, and any court proceedings shall be brought before the district court in Stavanger. 
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4.1.2 Contents of Operational Risk in the exhibits of Contract 1 
This following section is dedicated to highlighting how the exhibits of Contract 1 implement 
operational risk, and subsequently how the responsibility for this type of risk is divided between the 
parties. “Operational risk” is not mentioned explicitly in Contract 1. On this account, there is a need 
for searching for related terminology, such as (but not limited to): 
 Risk; 
 Liability; 
 Responsibility; 
 Damage; 
 Injury; 
 Death; 
 Loss; 
 Accident; 
 Safety 
and any form thereof. This will of course lead to a broad search, with a varying degree of relevance 
to the aim of the analysis. It is however necessary to read “between the lines” to be able to extract 
the information, if any is found. The following sub-chapters will present the findings of the above-
mentioned terminology, and any related provisions, which carry relevance in the search for contents 
of operational risk in the exhibits of Contract 1. 
 
4.1.2.1 Exhibit A – Scope of Work 
This exhibit describes the provisions for the scope of work after the delivery of the Contract 
Object(s). Since Contract 1 is a frame agreement, the level of detail in this chapter is fairly low, as 
more detailed descriptions of the scope of work is reserved for the various work packages released in 
conjunction with the frame agreement. 
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 It is stated in the exhibit, that the “Contractor shall plan and execute the Work with particular 
emphasis on safety, working environment, schedule and cost such that the Work can be 
completed safely on schedule and according to the agreed price .”  
Comment: This is a very general statement, which, as interpreted, comply the Contractor to perform 
the Work according to widely accepted industry practice.  
 There is a specification of the division of responsibility between the various sub-contractors 
of the Company performing the Work and contributing to the performance of the Work. This 
states that the Company’s other contractor(s) will have the operational responsibility for all 
surface handling and installation/retrieval operations of the equipment, and that the 
Contractor shall supervise this work, and only be responsible for the operation of the 
equipment delivered.  
Comment: Such a clear statement of the division of responsibility between the various sub-
contractors to the Company is highly important to avoid misunderstandings and conflicts arising from 
interface management. It also assigns risk handling to the party which is best suited at controlling the 
risk in a most efficient manner, that is, the party which has got the risk within its controls sphere. 
This is in compliance with acknowledged risk management theory. 
 The Contractor is contractually obligated to ensure continuity in the personnel working on 
the Project, with special attention on offshore working personnel.  
Comment: This highlights the risk of loss of personnel and competence. It is important to note that 
the risk of losing so-called key personnel can be difficult to calculate, as this risk depends on many 
intangible factors, such as working environment, internal company matters, external matters, etc. 
Losing key personnel in a project may lead to severe set-backs, causing both reputational and 
economic harm. As such, it represents a significant operational risk.  
 There are quite detailed requirements to the Contractor’s facilities, in where the Work will 
be performed, and the Contract Object(s) stored and maintained. This includes requirements 
of HSE-equipment such as safety-, first aid-, and firefighting equipment. There are also 
requirements of the Contractor’s organization to include and implemented quality 
assurance- and HSE-systems. 
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Comment: Such requirements manifest the Contractor’s responsibility in providing a safe workplace 
for both the equipment and personnel involved with the Work. This addresses the risk of having an 
unsafe working environment. 
 
4.1.2.2 Exhibit B – Compensation 
This exhibit, in addition to the appendices with the applicable rates, gives the details regarding the 
compensation to the Contractor for its services, and the prices and rates of equipment and personnel 
needed for performing the Work. The compensation scheme chosen in this agreement include lump 
sums, unit rates, daily rates and reimbursement. That is, the compensation depends on the nature of 
the service, i.e. whether the compensation covers personnel, produced equipment, rental 
equipment, etc.  
It is further stated in the exhibit, that the choice of compensation method is solely the Company’s 
prerogative, for whole work packages or parts thereof. It is stated that the Company reserves the 
right of paying the sums that should be compensated by lump sum or unit rates on a provisional sum 
basis. That means that the Contractor is deprived of the privilege of influencing the compensation 
format, which, as discussed in the theory-chapter, may present a significant part in the division of risk 
between the parties. 
In addition, it states the various situations for which the Contractor is not remunerated, such as 
when being on standby-time or downtime. The Contractor is not reimbursed when the Contractor, 
the equipment or any other event considered under the Contractor’s control under the Contract, is 
the cause of the standby-time. Standby-time is understood as lost productive time while performing 
work offshore, otherwise also known as downtime. In situations where the cause of the standby-time 
is outside of the Contractor’s control, such as when the weather conditions are unfavourable for 
performing the intended work, the Contractor is remunerated according to the applicable day-rate. 
As such, the contract terms are in accordance with contract theory, where the parties are equally 
liable for, and compensated accordingly, for the risks that fall within their respective control spheres.        
The Company also has the right to retain any payment of up to 10% of each monthly invoiced value, 
should the Contractor be found not to be in compliance with the Contract after implementation 
reviews, quality assurance audits or engineering technical audits within agreed due dates. This 
presents a powerful mean of the Company to ensure the Contractor complies with the Contract, and 
contrary, a substantial risk for the Contractor to always ensure that he is aligned with the terms and 
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conditions of the Contract. This represents an active use of incentives, and is in line with presented 
incentives theory. 
In long-lasting contracts and frame agreements, the variance in prices and costs due to factors 
outside of either party’s control, can pose a significant risk for the involved companies. These 
variances may be caused by, for example, inflation, changes in government tax regimes, interest 
rates, and or fluctuations in important commodities, such as the oil price. To mitigate this risk, 
Contract 1 has included escalation formulae, which are based on relevant published indexes from 
organizations such as BEAMA and the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics. The formulae use a 
benchmark value as a reference, e.g. the value of a certain index at the time of entering into the 
Contract, and apply changes to the day rates, lump sums and other agreed prices according to 
updated movements of that index at given time intervals. An important condition is included in the 
chapter on escalation in Contract 1. This condition states that the price after performing the 
escalation cannot, under no circumstances, be lower than the price before escalation. This effectively 
shields the Contractor from having to charge lower prices than initially agreed, and ensures that the 
Contractor is remunerated on a fair basis. For the Company, however, this clause prevents it from 
getting the Work performed at lower rates in times of recession. 
  
4.1.2.3 Exhibit C – Contract schedule 
This exhibit contains the provisions for the milestones and schedule for the progress of the Work 
within the frame agreement. Since the details of the respective work orders issued in the future are 
not revealed yet, this exhibit only states general provisions of administrative and operational 
milestones. 
The exhibit also states the amount of liquidated damages in the event of breach of milestones. This is 
set to NOK 10,000 per day, however, limited to 10% of the total Work Order compensation, 
according to article 24.2 in Contract 1. This is in line with the incentives theory presented in chapter 
2.1.2. 
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4.1.2.4 Exhibit D – Administration requirements 
Exhibit D states the administrative requirements of the Contractor, and lays the foundation of 
important formalities such as means of communication and organization of the Work. It also states 
that the Contractor is obliged to be in compliance with the ISO 9000-family of quality assurance 
standards. There are no provisions saying that the Contractor is obliged to follow any of standards 
within the ISO 9000 specifically, other than being “familiar with the ISO 9000 family”. This standard is 
not aimed at providing guidelines for risk management, per se, as this is covered by the ISO 31000 
Risk Management standard. However, there are no provisions in Contract 1 stating that this 
particular family of risk management standards (the ISO 31000) must be followed.  
According to the exhibit, the Contractor must have documented HSE-systems, and conduct its 
activities so that the Work is performed without injury, loss of life or any other damages. It does not 
state how this HSE-system shall be formed, or the contents thereof, other than that it must comply 
with the Company’s requirements for the management, supervision and monitoring of HSE. 
Uncertainty is to be managed actively by the Contractor, according to the provisions of the exhibit. 
This goes for uncertainty of both negative and positive nature. It is stated: 
“Uncertainty elements shall be handled systematically and include analysis of probability and 
consequence to risk areas representing loss potentials, and upside potentials representing possibilities 
for improvements.” 
Further, it states: 
“Risk exposure and upside potentials shall focus on uncertainties related to contract cost, execution 
time and major milestones, as well as other technical/ financial areas which are of relevance in terms 
of LCC (Life Cycle Cost).” 
It is not specified in the text how the term risk is to be understood, but it is fair to interpret that 
uncertainty is a central part of the definition according to Contract 1. Also, in line with the theory 
presented in this report, the concept captures the upside potentials involved with uncertain, or risky, 
events. 
There is an appendix included in Contract 1, containing specific rules and regulations with regards to 
managing HSE in the frame agreement, attached to the exhibit. This prescribes the International 
Safety Management Code (ISM code) as a normative HSE Management System reference. Further, it 
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gives seven main HSE management activities, acknowledged as appropriate to follow in compliance 
with the agreement. These activities are: 
1. Leadership and commitment; 
2. Policy and strategic objectives; 
3. Organization, resources and documentation; 
4. Evaluation and risk management – identification and evaluation of HSE risks in relation to 
activities and focus on risk-reduction measures; 
5. Planning and procedures; 
6. Implementation and monitoring; 
7. Auditing and reviewing. 
There is also an inclusion of a set of definitions of important terminology, e.g. incident, accident, loss 
potential, etc., however still no proper explicit definition of risk is included. It is further stated that: 
“Contractor shall apply suitable and generally recognized methods for the identification, assessment, 
control and recovery of hazards and effects. These methods shall be documented.” 
It is not specified which methods that are considered generally recognized, but one must assume 
that there is a portfolio of widely used methodology for managing hazards and risks, such as hazards 
and operability study (HAZOP), failure-mode, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA), fault tree 
analysis (FTA), and others.  
Under this exhibit, in the appendix HES requirements [sic], there is a special focus on the Contractor’s 
responsibilities with regards to managing physical, chemical, ergonomic and 
psychosocial/organisational concerns in relation to performing the Work at the Contractor’s 
premises. The Contractor is further obliged to follow the Company’s proceedings and HSE-
philosophy, in addition to any government issued laws and regulations relevant for the Work. 
However, there is no mentioning of the Company’s obligations in facilitating these requirements 
while the Contractor is working on the Company’s or its sub-contractor’s facility, i.e. on the offshore 
vessel or other facilities provided by the Company. Parts of the Work, for example the installation 
work, are performed on premises that are not controlled by the Contractor. That leaves the 
Contractor in the hands of the goodwill of the Company, when it comes to facilitating the Work 
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according to the requirements laid down for HSE-management as described in the appendix. The 
Company will of course be bound by government laws and regulations to ensure a satisfactory 
regime and conditions for HSE, but as for the relationship between the Contractor and the Company, 
the Company carries no obligations towards the Contractor according to Contract 1. 
The subsequent exhibits E (Specifications), F (Drawings), G (Company Provided Items), H 
(Subcontractors), J (Standard Bank Guarantee), K (Contractor’s Proprietary Information) and L 
(Standard Parent Company Guarantee) do not contain any noteworthy formulations with regards to 
operational risk or any related matters. On this account, they have not been included for 
commenting in this analysis. 
 
4.2 Analysis of Contract 2 
In the following, a contract between the Service Company and a field operator (different than the 
one in Contract 1) will be analysed. The purpose of the contract is to regulate work in connection 
with aftermarket services for a subsea field on the NCS for a period of five years. The field operator, 
or Company, was relatively new on the NCS at the time of entering into the contract agreement, and 
did not have much experience as a field operator on the NCS. The Company has focused its core 
strategy in other parts of the World, but does also take part as a licensee in other fields on the NCS. 
The Contract is the only one between the parties, at least for work on the NCS, and it includes 
options of extension upon agreement between the parties.  
The contract of interest is further denoted as “Contract 2” in the analysis. Also, for the sake of 
simplicity, “the Contractor” is to be understood as “the Service Company” and “the Company” is to 
be understood as “the field operator”, or “the customer” of the Service Company, in the following 
text, in accordance with the terminology of Contract 2.  
As performed on the previous analysis of Contract 1, a natural starting point is to compare the main 
parts of the various standard contract formats to that of Contract 2. See Table 5 below for an 
overview of the main parts of the standard contract formats and Contract 2. 
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Part NTK 07 NF 07 NSC 05 Contract 2 
I General provisions General provisions General provisions General provisions 
II Performance of the 
work 
Performance of the 
work 
Performance of 
the work 
Performance of 
the work 
III Progress of the work Progress of the work Progress of the 
work 
Progress of the 
work 
IV Variations, cancellation 
and suspension 
Variations, cancellation 
and suspension 
Variations and 
cancellation 
Variations and 
cancellation 
V Delivery and payment Delivery and payment Delivery and 
payment 
Completion and 
payment 
VI Breach of contract Breach of contract Breach of contract Breach of contract 
VII Force majeure Force majeure Force majeure Force majeure 
VIII Liability and insurances Liability and insurances Liability and 
insurances 
Liability and 
insurances 
IX Limitation and exclusion 
of liability 
Limitation and exclusion 
of liability 
Proprietary rights, 
etc. 
Other provisions 
X Proprietary rights etc. Proprietary rights etc. Other provisions  
XI Other provisions Other provisions   
Table 5: Comparison of the main parts in Contract 2 to the main parts of the standard contract formats (Norsk Industri, 
2007b), (Norsk Industri, 2007a) and (Norsk Olje & Gass, 2005). 
 
As can be seen from the table above, Contract 2 includes almost all of the main parts as the standard 
contract formats, and is close to NSC 05 in terms of main contents, with the exception of Contract 2 
lacking part IX on proprietary rights. However, when looking more closely into the articles included in 
Contract 2, it is evident that the articles under part IX in NSC 05 are in place in Contract 2 after all. 
See Table 6 below for an overview of the main parts and articles of NSC 05 and Contract 2. 
Part NSC 05 Part CONTRACT 2 
I GENERAL PROVISIONS I GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Art.1 Definitions Art.1 Definitions 
Art.2 Contract documents – interpretation Art.2 Contract documents – interpretation 
Art.3 Representatives of the parties Art.3 Representatives of the parties 
II PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK II PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK 
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Art.4 Obligations of Contractor and Company 
– main rules 
Art.4 Obligations of Contractor – main rules 
Art.5 Authority requirements – permits Art.5 Authority requirements – permits 
Art.6 Drawings and specifications – Company 
Provided Items  
Art.6 Company provided documents 
Art.7 Subcontracts Art.7 Contractor provided documents 
Art.8 Contractor Personnel Art.8 Subcontracts 
Art.9 The Spread Art.9 The Site 
Art.10 Quality assurance and health, safety and 
environment 
Art.10 Personnel for the Work, trade union 
activities 
III PROGRESS OF THE WORK III PROGRESS OF THE WORK 
Art.11 Contract Schedule – delayed progress Art.11 Contract Schedule – delayed progress 
IV VARIATIONS AND CANCELLATION IV VARIATIONS AND CANCELLATION 
Art.12 Right to vary the Work Art.12 Right to vary the Work 
Art.13 Effects of Variation to the Work Art.13 Not in use 
Art.14 Issue of Variation Orders Art.14 Issue of Variation Orders 
Art.15 Consequences of variation orders – 
disputes about consequences 
Art.15 Consequences of variation orders – 
disputes about consequences 
Art.16 Dispute as to whether a variation to the 
work exists – disputed variation order 
Art.16 Dispute as to whether a variation to the 
work exists – disputed variation order 
Art.17 Cancellation Art.17 Cancellation 
Art.18 Company’s right to temporarily suspend 
the Work. 
Art.18 Company’s right to temporarily suspend 
the Work. 
V DELIVERY AND PAYMENT V COMPLETION AND PAYMENT 
Art.19 Delivery and Completion of the Work Art.19 Delivery and Completion of the Work 
Art.20 Payment, invoicing and audit Art.20 Payment of the Contract Price – 
invoicing and audit 
Art.21 Security for Company’s claims Art.21 Security for Company’s claims 
Art.22 Title – right to demand delivery Art.22 Title to the Contract Object; right to 
demand delivery  
Art.23 Contractor’s guarantee – acceptance 
certificate 
Art.23 Contractor guarantee – acceptance 
certificate 
VI BREACH OF CONTRACT VI BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Art.24 Contractor’s delay Art.24 Contractor’s delay 
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Art.25 Contractor’s defects and guarantee 
liability 
Art.25 Contractor’s defects and guarantee 
liability 
Art.26 Termination due to Contractor’s breach 
of Contract 
Art.26 Termination due to Contractor’s breach 
of Contract 
Art.27 Company’s breach of Contract Art.27 Company’s breach of Contract 
VII FORCE MAJEURE VII FORCE MAJEURE 
Art.28 Effects of Force Majeure Art.28 Effects of Force Majeure 
VIII LIABILITY AND INSURANCES VIII LIABILITY AND INSURANCES 
Art.29 Loss or damage to the Contract Object 
or Company Provided Items 
Art.29 Loss of or damage to the Contract 
Object or Company Provided Items 
Art.30 Exclusion of liability – indemnification Art.30 Exclusion of liability. Indemnification 
Art.31 Insurance Art.31 Insurances 
IX PROPRIETARY RIGHTS, ETC. Art.32 Limitation and exclusion of liability 
Art.32 Rights to information, technology and 
inventions 
Art.33 Rights to information, technology and 
inventions 
Art.33 Confidential information Art.34 Confidential Information 
X OTHER PROVISIONS X OTHER PROVISIONS 
Art.34 Limitation and exclusion of liability Art.35 Assignment of the Contract, etc. 
Art.35 Assignment – mortgage Art.36 Applicable laws and disputes 
Art.36 Notices Art.37 Care of Company owned equipment 
and/or materials 
Art.37 Norwegian law and disputes Art.38 Governing language 
  Art.39 Non-waiver default 
  Art.40 Conflict of interest 
  Art.41 Tax 
Table 6: Comparison of the main parts and articles of Contract 2 and NSC 05 (Norsk Olje & Gass, 2005) 
 
As can be seen from the table above, there are some differences in the contents of Contract 2 and 
the standard format of NSC 05, where some articles are omitted while others are added. However, 
for the main parts, it seems to be following the same structure. And since Contract 2 is concerning 
aftermarket services involving a subsea field, the NSC 05 standard format is the best choice of 
reference. 
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In the following sub-chapter, the provisions in the articles of Contract 2 will be compared with the 
contents in the articles of NSC 05. 
  
4.2.1 Comparison between Contract 2 and NSC 05 
Important similarities and differences between the conditions of contract in NSC 05 and Contract 1 
are listed below. The findings may be of a more or less relevant nature to the topic of this report. The 
less relevant findings are included for the curiosity and added perspective of the reader, while the 
more relevant findings are included and followed by a comment. The intention is to find out how the 
terms and conditions in Contract 2 are in comparison with the reference, which is the standard 
format of NSC 05. 
 Contract 2 only utilizes the exhibits A (Scope of Work), B (Compensation), C (Contract 
Schedule), D (Administration Requirements) and F (HSE). The other exhibits usually included 
are not in use in Contract 2. 
Comment: By leaving out the other important exhibits, such as exhibit G – Company Provided Items, 
exhibit H – Subcontractors, exhibit I – Company’s Insurances, etc., the contracting parties leave a lot 
of useful information in the dark. Also, a lot of provisions on division of liability may be unresolved. 
This can potentially cause problems during the contract period.    
 Article 4 – Obligations of Contractor – main rules, is generally more specific in Contract 2 
than in NSC 05. In addition to the provisions stated in NSC 05, the article in Contract 2 
includes statements on the role of a third party, or an Affiliated Company, i.e. a company 
that the Contractor controls 20% or more of the share capital in, or vice versa. Also worth 
mentioning, is the fact that there are no statements of the obligations of the Company given 
in the article. Art. 4 in NSC 05 also include the obligations of the Company.   
Where NSC 05 includes the rights of remuneration and adjustments in Contract Schedule for 
the Contractor in case of prevention of the Work due to weather downtime (Art. 4.7), 
Contract 2 gives no such considerations in the above-mentioned article. 
Comment: Not including the obligations of the Company under the main rules, presents an unfair 
balance in the Contract. Also, downtime due to unfavourable weather conditions is very common in 
the North Sea, and the provisions concerning this event should be included in the Contract, as it is in 
NSC 05.   
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 In Article 5 – Authority requirements – permits, Contract 2 includes the parties 
indemnification of each other in the event where either party fails to maintain or obtain 
required approvals, licenses, authorizations and permits, and costs and/or payments are 
incurred on this account. This is not included in article 5 in NSC 05. 
Comment: This statement of indemnification may prove to be useful in the event where one party is 
not able to maintain the necessary approvals, licenses, etc. Thus, it presents a shield against this risk 
for the affected party, whose ability of controlling this risk is very limited, if possible to control at all.     
 Article 6 – Company Provided Documents, differs between NSC 05 and Contract 2. In NSC 05, 
the article is regarding Company Provided Items, i.e. all documents and equipment provided 
by the Company, whereas article 6 in Contract 2 is regarding Company Provided Documents, 
i.e. only the documentation in relation to the Work. Article 7 in Contract 2 is about the 
Contractor Provided Documents.  
Article 6 in Contract 2 states the Contractor’s entitlement to adjustments in the Contract 
Price and/or Contract Schedule in the event where defects, conflicts, omissions, errors and 
inconsistencies are discovered in the Company Provided Documents, and when they are 
presented to the Company without unreasonable delay. Such a statement is not included in 
article 6 in NSC 05, with the exemption of adjustments to the Contract Price and/or Contract 
Schedule as a compensation for delays or costs incurred as a result of soil and seabed 
conditions at the installation site. Soil and seabed conditions are not a part of the provisions 
in Contract 2.  
Should the Contractor fail to give notice to the Company, or fail to discover defects which 
ought to have been discovered, and this incurs a direct extra cost for the Company, which is 
not covered by insurance, then the Contractor is obliged to carry all such costs.  
Comment: This presents a significant risk for the Contractor. For example, if the Company has 
provided the Contractor with operational procedures for some equipment, and this contains errors 
which were not, but ought to have been, discovered by the Contractor before use, and this leads to 
equipment damage, the Contractor is liable for any extra costs incurred for the damages caused by 
the misuse. This emphasizes the importance for the Contractor to go through all Company Provided 
Documents to mitigate this risk. 
 Art.7 – Contractor Provided Documents in Contract 2 states that the Contractor has got a 
“…full responsibility for Contractor Provided Documents.” An interesting thing to notice here 
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is that while the Contractor is responsible for discovering and notifying the Company of any 
findings of errors in the Company Provided Documents, no such obligations are applicable for 
the Company when it comes to discovering errors in the Contractor Provided Documents. 
Comment: This presents an unfair division of responsibility on behalf of the Contractor. Both parties 
should be equally responsible for discovering and notifying each other of faults in their respectively 
provided documents.     
 Contract 2 includes a separate article (article 9) regarding the Site where the Work is being 
performed. Parts of what is included in this article is found elsewhere, under slightly 
different, however not significant, formulations in the NSC 05. 
 Article 10 – Personnel for the Work, trade union activities in Contract 2 prescribes a penalty 
for the Contractor in such cases where personnel considered as key personnel are withdrawn 
from their positions without the Company’s prior approval. Such a penalty is not included in 
NSC 05. In NSC 05, there is a clause in article 8 – Contractor’s personnel, stating that the 
Contractor must obtain the Company’s approval before appointing, transferring or replacing 
key personnel.  
Comment: This highlights the risk of losing important personnel in the duration of a project. The loss 
of key personnel may have adverse effects on the progress and performance of the project, which in 
turn induces a cost element. Mitigation of this risk includes proper documentation and 
communication within the project team, and ensuring a well-prepared transfer of competence 
should personnel be removed from the project.   
 Article 9 – the Spread in NSC 05 is not included in Contract 2, nor mentioned in any other 
relevant article in the conditions of contract. This article presents the requirements for the 
Spread to be used in connection with the Work. 
Comment: The Spread is an integral part in the performance of the Work, and as discussed earlier, 
the risks involved with having equipment failure and/or damage, is always present. When provisions 
concerning the Spread are not implemented in Contract 2, it fails to address this risk.   
 The provisions given in article 10 – Quality assurance and health, safety and environment in 
NSC 05 are included in article 4 – Obligations of Contractor – main rules in Contract 2. 
 Article 13 – Effects of Variation to the Work in Contract 2, resembles to a large degree article 
13 in NF 07, more than article 13 in NSC 05. Article 13 in Contract 2 and NF 07, includes a 
83 
 
condition in where the Contractor Price is increased by 6% on the difference between the 
new and original Contract Price, should the Contract Price be reduced to below the original 
Contract Price as a consequence of accumulated Variation to the Work. 
Comment: This clause shields the Contractor, to some degree, against the consequences of deflating 
the value of the Contract Price due to variations to the Work. However, the clause is conditional on 
that the Contractor is not able to utilize his freed workforce (due to less work related to the Contract) 
elsewhere. 
 Article 15 – Consequences of Variation Orders – disputes about consequences in Contract 2, 
fails to state the claimant party’s right of being paid interest rates on the differential amount 
between the provisional payment (upon initiation of dispute) and the final payment (after 
solving the dispute), according to “Forsinkelsesrenteloven” (Interest on Overdue Payment) in 
Norwegian legislation. This is explicitly stated in NSC 05. 
Comment: The interest rate may be a substantial amount of money. However, one must assume that 
the legislation in “Forsinkelsesrenteloven” is applicable, even though the term is not explicitly stated 
in Contract 2.  
 Article 17 – Cancellation in Contract 2, includes a clause which states that the cancellation 
fees entitled to the Contractor, shall only apply if the value of the cancellation in total 
exceeds 20% of the original Contract Value. Such a clause is not included in NSC 05.  
Also, NSC 05 includes cancellation fees based on time to mobilization, where the cancellation 
fee is increased in percentage of the Contract Price as the time to mobilization is 
approached. This is not included in Contract 2. 
Comment: This implies that the Contractor must carry much of the fees involved with cancellation of 
the Work in relation to the Contract. This threshold percentage value enables the parties to share 
more of the costs involved with a contract cancellation. It should be noted however, that the 
Company is either way responsible for compensating the Contractor for Work performed up until the 
cancellation, and for any Materials purchased in connection with the Work, before cancellation took 
place. 
 Article 18 – Company’s right to temporarily suspend the Work in Contract 2, adds the right of 
the Contractor to cancel the Contract should the Work or parts thereof be suspended 
continuously for a period exceeding 120 days, by giving the Company 14-day notice. Such an 
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option is not given to the Contractor in article 18 of NSC 05. However, under article 18 in NSC 
05, the Contractor is given the right to demobilize the Spread to fulfil other commitments, 
e.g. to service other contracts, should the Work be suspended in exceedance of 10 days. 
Comment: The possibility of cancelling the Contract after a period of suspension provides a valuable 
option for the Contractor, as he is then free to pursue other, more fruitful contracts. This evens out 
the Company’s and Contractor’s rights of suspending or cancelling the Work, should the other party 
not fulfil its obligations.  
 Article 20 – Payment of the Contract Price – invoicing and audit in Contract 2, states the right 
of the infringed party to be paid interest according to “Forsinkelsesrenteloven” (Interest on 
Overdue Payment) in Norwegian legislation, should the other party not be able to pay for its 
obligations in accordance with the Contract. This condition is not explicitly included in NSC 
05. 
Comment: As mentioned earlier, one must assume that the “Forsinkelsesrenteloven” is applicable 
anyway, although the terms are not explicitly stated in the NSC 05.   
 The maximum liability under the Bank Guarantee is amounted to 10% of the Contract Price, 
according to article 21 in Contract 2. This coincides with the amount in NSC 05. 
 The maximum amount of accumulated liquidated damages is limited to 10% of the Contract 
Price, according to article 24 – Contractor’s delay in Contract 2. This is also stated in NSC 05. 
Comment: Such a clause shields the Contractor against the risk of having to pay a substantial amount 
of money in liquidated damages to the Company. It is assumed that the clause is included to avoid 
having a situation where the Contractor is fined to a degree where the option of walking away from 
the Project is actually better than finishing it. It is very costly for both parties to abandon the 
Contract in mid-term, and hence it should be in the interest of both parties to finish the Work. This 
coincides with incentives theory, in that placing too much weight on incentives (i.e. increasing the 
risk for the Contractor), could prove to damage the intention of the incentives scheme. 
 According to article 25.4 in NSC 05, the Contractor’s liability for rectification work after the 
issue of the Completion Certificate and for damages under article 25.3, is limited to 15% of 
the Contract Price. Such a limitation is not included in Contract 2.  
Contract 2 includes a clause in article 25, which indemnifies the Contractor from any extra 
costs associated with rectification work below the water line. This clause is not included in 
NSC 05.  
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Comment: The costs associated with such rectification work could prove to be substantial, and the 
risk for the Contractor would consequentially be high. However, by introducing a shield from any 
extra costs associated with rectification work below the water line, the Company is most likely more 
suited at carrying the costs and absorbing the risks involved with such work. This is also in line with 
presented theory. 
 Article 26 – Termination due to Contractor’s Breach of Contract in NSC 05, includes clauses 
regarding termination due to the Spread not performing as intended or within the provisions 
of the Contract. As mentioned, the Spread is not included in any termination clauses in 
Contract 2, nor in any other articles for that matter. 
According to Contract 2, if the Contract is terminated, the Company is entitled to use the 
Contractor’s Site, equipment, tools, drawings, etc., as necessary to complete the Contract 
Object, at the Company’s cost. Such work can also be performed by a Third Party appointed 
by the Company. Such a clause is not included in NSC 05, other than the Company’s 
entitlement to take over from the Contractor, the Contract Object, Subcontracts, Company 
Provided Items, Materials and other relevant documents. However, the Company is not 
entitled to use the Contractor’s Site for this work according to NSC 05. 
Comment: Further provisions on division of responsibilities and liabilities regarding the Company’s or 
any Third Party’s work on the Contractor’s Site, without the Contractor’s involvement, are not 
included in Contract 2, other than that the Contractor shall not be liable for any Work performed by 
others or providing a guarantee for such work. It is stated that this option is only applicable for a 
limited time period and that any business secrets or know-how acquired during such work shall only 
be used for the completion of the Contract Object.  
Also, article 26 in Contract 2 specifies the maximum liability of the Contractor for 
consequences arising due to termination of the Contract, due to the Contractor’s breach of 
contract. This is set to 10% total and aggregate of the part of the work terminated. In any 
event, the Contractor’s total accumulated liability in Contract 2 is limited to 100% of the 
Purchase Order price. This is not specified in article 26 in NSC 05. 
Comment: A total accumulated liability of 100% of the Purchase Order Price presents a great liability 
for the Contractor, but at the same time shields against the indirect costs which may arise from a 
contract cancellation, and which are fully carried by the Company. 
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 Article 27 – Company’s Breach of Contract in NSC 05, specifies the Company’s obligations of 
paying interest to the Contractor in accordance with “Forsinkelsesrenteloven” (Interest on 
Overdue Payment) in Norwegian legislation, should it be late with payments that are due to 
the Contractor according to the Contract. 
Also, the article gives the Contractor the right of suspending the Work or terminating the 
Contract in the event where the Company is in substantial breach of its payment obligations.  
Neither of the above-mentioned clauses are included in Contract 2, omitting an important 
contractual option, i.e. suspension or termination of the Contract, for the Contractor. 
Comment: As mentioned before, one must assume that the ruling legislation is applicable in 
situations such as these, and that while Contract 2 does not explicitly state the obligations of the 
Company, it is still liable by law.  
 Article 28 – Force Majeure in Contract 2, presents a rather detailed overview of situations 
which may be characterized as being caused by force majeure, in addition to situations which 
are not considered to be caused by force majeure. Such a detailed description is not included 
in NSC 05.  
In NSC 05, the Company is given the right to cancel the Contract if a force majeure situation 
lasts without interruption for 60 days or more, while the Contractor is given the same right 
after 180 days. In Contract 2, both parties are given the right to cancel the Contract after 180 
days or more of an uninterrupted force majeure situation. 
Comment: Force majeure situations are, by definition, outside of the control sphere of either 
involved party. Hence, it is only fair and logical that each party shall reserve the same rights of 
contract cancellation if a force majeure situation should be prevailing. In this instance, Contract 2 
must be considered to be fairer than NSC 05.  
 According to article 29 – Loss of or damage to the Contract Object or Company Provided 
Items in Contract 2, the Contractor is responsible for any loss or damage to Company Group’s 
property, while all such property is in Contractor Group’s (including any Subcontractors) care, 
custody and control. This liability is limited to $250,000 for any one occurrence for the 
Contractor. In article 29 in NSC 05, the Contractor is indemnified from this liability when the 
loss or damage is caused by the Company Group, or when the loss or damage is due to war 
or nuclear damage. 
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Comment: Having the Contractor liable for loss or damage to the Contract Object or Company 
Provided Items is fair according to risk theory, as the Contractor is then the party better suited at 
controlling the risk. Also, including a cost limit to the damages incurred provides the Contractor with 
an important shield against damages that are disproportionally large.   
 Article 30 – Exclusion of liability – indemnification in Contract 2, limits the Contractor’s 
liability for loss or damage arising out of each accident to $2 million, while NSC 05 operates 
with a $5 million limit with the same terms. 
In NSC 05, article 30 states that the Company “shall indemnify the Contractor Group against 
all claims and losses which arise out of or in any way relate directly and/or indirectly to 
performance of the Work or is caused by the Contract Object in its lifetime and resulting from 
one or more of the following: 
a) Reservoir seepage or pollution originating underground 
b) Fire, explosion or blow-out of any well or reservoir 
c) Escape of product from any facility, including pipeline or other subsea or surface 
facility, at any offshore and/or onshore Site.” 
In Contract 2, the above-mentioned indemnification is not mentioned. However, in Contract 
2, the Company is obliged to reimburse the Contractor for loss of or damage to property, 
materials or equipment of Contractor Group, which occurs while in-hole (i.e. when 
performing work in the well) or below the rotary table (i.e. drill floor on a drilling rig or ship), 
unless caused by defective equipment or by Contractor’s negligence. Also, the Company 
takes the responsibility of fishing for in-hole equipment of the Contractor Group while in-
hole or below the rotary table.  
Comment: Such operations, normally performed by means of wireline work in the well, can be very 
costly, and involves the work of other sub-contractors to the Company. On this account, the 
Contractor is shielded from a potentially high-cost and high-risk operation in Contract 2. This must be 
considered to be in line with risk theory, as the Contractor is then shielded against risk that is to a 
large degree outside of his control sphere.  
 Article 31 – Insurances in Contract 2 does not specify that the P&I insurance (Protection & 
Indemnity insurance) needs to be effected with a member of the International Group of P&I 
Clubs, or comparable insurers, as it is specified in article 31 in NSC 05. 
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 Article 32 – Limitation and exclusion of liability in Contract 2 (corresponds to article 34 by the 
same name in NSC 05), states that the Contractor’s total liability in case of Breach of Contract 
is limited to 100% of the Purchase Order Value (i.e. the contract value). In NSC 05, this limit is 
set to 25% of the Contract Price.  
In addition, each party agree to indemnify each other for any indirect losses, such as loss of 
earnings, loss of profit, loss due to pollution and loss of production. This applies regardless of 
any liability, whether strict or by negligence of either party.  
Comment: Being liable for a maximum amount of 100% of the Purchase Order Value (contract price) 
in Contract 2, as opposed to being liable for 25% of the Contract Price in NSC 05, substantially 
increases the risk exposure of the Contractor in Contract 2, compared to in NSC 05.  
When it comes to the provisions on indirect losses, such losses may prove to become substantial, but 
may, due to their nature, be very difficult to tie to the events leading to the loss in the first place. By 
avoiding disputes concerning indirect losses at all, the parties mitigate potentially time-consuming 
and costly court proceedings, should a conflict between the parties be escalated.   
 Article 37 – Care of Company owned equipment and/or materials in Contract 2, is not 
included as a separate article in NSC 05. This states the Contractor’s responsibility for the 
Company owned equipment and the Contractor’s obligations of making good any loss or 
damage. This is also partly covered by article 29 – Loss of or damage to the Contract Object 
or Company Provided Items, where also an upper limit of liability of $250,000 is included. 
Comment: The risk of damage and failure of equipment and tools used offshore is always present. 
The Contractor is usually responsible for operating and maintaining this equipment, due to the 
knowledge and know-how the Contractor possesses on the equipment. Being responsible for any 
damages and failure of the equipment is therefore just and in accordance with presented theory, as 
it falls within the Contractor’s control sphere. Also, by introducing an upper limit of liability in this 
matter, the Contractor is shielded against the events where equipment failure induces abnormally 
high costs.  
 Contract 2 has included a clause regarding conflict of interest in Article 40 – Conflict of 
interest, which is not included in NSC 05.  
Comment: This clause is most likely included to emphasize the importance of avoiding bribery, 
corruption and other dealings that would cause harm to the intentions in the Contract, and the 
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parties involved therein. The risk of damage to reputation and business caused by bribery and 
corruption is especially high for international companies involved in contracts in countries and 
regions where such conduct is more prevalent.  
 Contract 2 also includes an article regarding government tax payments, the provisions 
thereof and its impact on the relationship between the Contractor and the Company. Such 
provisions are not included in NSC 05, as this, on all accounts, is mainly a matter between the 
Norwegian state and the respective parties.  
Comment: This article is perhaps included anyhow, to stress the Company’s exclusion from any 
taxation disputes that the Contractor, or its Subcontractors, might have with the authorities. As such, 
the risk of being entangled into a potentially damaging tax dispute is clearly addressed in the 
Contract. 
 
4.2.2 Contents of Operational Risk in the exhibits of Contract 2 
This following section is dedicated to highlighting how the exhibits included in Contract 2 implements 
operational risk, and subsequently how the responsibility for this type of risk is divided between the 
parties. As in Contract 1, Operational risk is not mentioned explicitly in any parts of Contract 2. On 
this account, there is a need for searching for related terminology, such as: 
 Risk; 
 Liability; 
 Responsibility; 
 Damage; 
 Injury; 
 Death; 
 Loss; 
 Accident; 
 Safety 
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and any form thereof. This will of course lead to a broad search, with a varying degree of relevance 
to the aim of the analysis. It is however necessary to read “between the lines” to be able to extract 
the information, if any are found. The following sub-chapters will present the findings of the above-
mentioned terminology, and any related provisions, which carry relevance in the search for contents 
of operational risk in the exhibits of Contract 2. As in the previous text, findings which require special 
attention are commented on within the text. 
 
4.2.2.1 Exhibit A – Scope of Work 
This exhibit describes all the types of Work included within the provisions of the Contract, including a 
high-level description of the deliverables and services to be supplied by the Contractor. More 
detailed descriptions of the Scope of Work are reserved for the Purchase Orders issued before the 
various service works to be performed as part of the Contract. 
 There is no explicit mentioning of operational risk, hazards, risk, probability/consequence or 
any other risk-related terms in the exhibit. However, it is stated that the Contractor obliges 
to plan and execute the Work with a high focus on the working environment, schedule, cost 
and safety. Also, the Contractor must ensure that the Work is performed in accordance with 
good practice, and by qualified and competent personnel. 
Comment: These provisions are highly general and do not provide any specific restrictions or 
guidelines for the Contractor to relate to.  
 There is no mentioning in this exhibit of any safety standards, risk standards, quality 
management standards, or any other industry standards, that the Contractor must be in 
compliance with, in connection with the Work within the frames of Contract. There is a 
requirement for the Contractor to have in place a Quality Management System and to 
participate in safety activities and administration within the frames of the Contract, but there 
are no further details or descriptions on the form this shall take. 
Comment: This lack of reference to a common standard to follow in connection with the work might 
prove challenging, and induce subjectivity into the valuation of the performance of the Work. 
 The Contractor is obliged to provide an organization with the professional qualifications 
necessary to conduct the offshore operations and onshore maintenance work. There is no 
further description of what these qualifications shall be. 
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Comment: By not specifying the various qualifications required for the performance of the Work, the 
Company entrusts the Contractor into delegating the required qualified personnel to conduct the 
Work in accordance with the provisions of the Contract.   
 The facilities of the Contractor, where the Work, or parts of the Work is taking place, is 
required to be maintained in a clean, safe and tidy condition. 
 The Company is appointed and responsible for handling the interfaces between the various 
subcontractors of the Company, who are involved in performing the Work.  
Comment: This statement is important, as there is a need for a high-level coordination of the 
interfaces that exist in connection with performing the Work, especially in offshore operations. The 
Company is a natural choice for such a role, as it is the Company’s subcontractors that are 
performing the Work. This is also in line with accepted risk theory. 
 It is stated that the Contractor is responsible for “management of Contractor health and 
safety and protection of the environment”. It is not specified how this is to be managed, or to 
what standard the HSE-program shall be. 
 The Company shall approve the personnel who are to perform the Work during offshore 
operations. This approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. The requirements of the 
offshore personnel is that they have the necessary certifications (courses and health 
certificate), and a proven ability to perform the work in a safe manner, to protect the 
environment, the health and safety of the Company’s and Contractor’s personnel, their 
families and the public. 
Comment: Human error is a constant risk in any operation, and the consequences thereof may be 
severe when performing offshore operations. On this account, ensuring the competence and proper 
qualification of the offshore personnel becomes an important mitigating factor of this operational 
risk. 
  
4.2.2.2 Exhibit B - Compensation  
This exhibit provides the information on the provisions regarding the compensation from the 
Company to the Contractor, with applicable rates, sums and prices for equipment and personnel. In 
addition, the delivery terms for the equipment to be used in connection with the Work is presented. 
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 The prices assigned in the Contract are subject to adjustment according to a formula. The 
input into the formula is the original rates at contract reward and labour wage index 
movements, published by the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics. It is important to note 
that following adjustment, the rates and fees can be adjusted both upwards and downwards.  
Comment: This induces uncertainty for both the Contractor and the Company, and would thus 
intuitively be considered to be fairly divided. However, the respective parties’ ability to absorb 
changes in rates may be substantially different, and beyond the vision of this report. The question of 
a fair division of this risk must on this account remain unsolved in this report.  
 The Company is responsible for and will be fully charged for any loss or damage beyond 
repair of rental equipment used in performing the Work. This also applies for replacement of 
seals and, of damaged, or non-reusable parts. 
Comment: As discussed previously, the risk of having equipment failure and damage during 
operations are always present, and may constitute a major risk as well, in that third party equipment 
may also be affected, in addition to injury to personnel. By taking on this responsibility, the Company 
shields the Contractor from this risk. There is however a question if rather the Contractor should 
carry some of this risk, as he is usually the operator of the rental equipment, and thus the closest 
party to controlling the risk. 
 The Company is also obliged to compensate the Contractor in the event where rental of 
equipment is cancelled by the Company and the reasons for doing so is outside the 
Contractor’s control sphere. 
Comment: This is a fair clause, and by compensating the Contractor for its losses due to a cancelled 
equipment rental, the Company shields the Contractor from risks that are outside of the Contractor’s 
control sphere. 
 
4.2.2.3 Exhibit C – Contract Schedule 
The Contract Schedule will be included in each applicable Purchase Order. There is no high-level 
schedule for the whole duration of the Contract. On this account, there are no findings worth 
mentioning in this exhibit. 
 
93 
 
4.2.2.4 Exhibit D – Administration requirements 
This exhibit presents the Company’s requirements for the administrative work and conditions in 
connection with the Contract. It is stated in the exhibit that it is desired from the Company that the 
Contractor utilizes his own internal system, methods and procedures, and that the provisions of the 
exhibit are merely a guide to ensure that the required quality, safety level and control over the Work 
is accomplished.  
 The Contractor is obliged to operate a documented quality system in conformance with the 
ISO 9000 series, or equivalent.  
Comment: The ISO 9000-series is concerning quality management.  
 It is stated that non-conformance handling shall be in compliance with ISO 9001:2000, clause 
8.3, regarding non-conforming products. 
 Quality plans for the Work shall be in accordance with the requirements laid down in ISO 
9004, section 5.3.3, or similar. ISO 9004, section 5.3.3 presents guidelines on deploying 
strategies and policies. 
 The Contractor is obliged under the Contract to have a corporate HSE policy document. The 
Company reserves the right to audit the Contractor’s HSE system and its implementation. 
This audit will be performed by using recognized standards. 
Comment: It is not further stated what these standards might be, or who will be the responsible 
party for recognizing these standards (the Company or any Third Party). This induces uncertainty for 
the Contractor, as it is not clear from the statements in the Contract whether his HSE policy 
document is in line with the Company’s expectations or not. 
 The Contractor’s nominated personnel for performing the Work shall be responsible for the 
performance of the Work, progress control, planning, cost control, interface work and 
reporting. The Company is to be notified when significant changes are made to the 
organization or personnel. 
Comment: Again, this highlights the awareness of the operational risk of losing key personnel in a 
project.  
 With regards to risk, the Contractor is obliged to implement a Risk Management System 
which describes how the identified risks are mitigated and controlled. According to the 
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exhibit, the Contractor shall register the ten most important risks, and the corresponding 
descriptions of risk-reducing actions, for tools and equipment that are constructed and 
delivered as part of the Contract. 
Comment: The exhibit does not present any provisions with regards to any risk management 
standards the Contractor must adhere to, such as ISO 31000. Nor does it state the rationale behind 
why the ten most important risks must be registered (why not, say, eleven?). 
 The Contractor is responsible for ensuring that all transportation and lifting appliances 
provided by the Contractor for storage and transportation are inspected, testes and 
approved according to the regulations from the Directorate of Labour Inspection 
(“Arbeidstilsynet”). With regards to transportation of equipment and tools related to the 
performance of the Work, the Contractor is responsible for transportation between the 
Contractor’s base and the Company’s onshore base, or nominated heliport.  
Comment: Damages and mishandling of equipment and tools during transportation and handling, 
both offshore and onshore presents a significant risk (see chapter 2.2.2.4). The Contractor is however 
best suited at controlling this risk, as the Contractor in most cases, ensure the packing and 
preservation of equipment to be used in the Work, before being transported between the various 
locations. As such, this statement is in line with presented theory. 
 In addition to the requirements mentioned above, which are mainly directed at the 
Contractor, the exhibit also presents a number of obligations of the Company. This includes: 
o Helicopter transportation for personnel to and from the offshore Worksite. 
o First aid and medical services at the offshore Worksite, in addition to provision of 
rescue and survival equipment. 
o Containers for disposal of chemicals, contaminated material and any toxic or 
hazardous substances originating from the Work performed offshore, and the 
disposal of such material. 
o Cranes for lifting the equipment and tools at the supply base and at the offshore 
Worksite. 
o Provision of special personal protective equipment (PPE) at the offshore Worksite. 
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Comment: The list of Company obligations presented above, include some operations involving 
significant risks and hazards for the project personnel, such as helicopter transportation. Specifying 
the Company’s responsibility of handling the risks involved with this, presents an important division 
of liability, as it is the Company who is the most suited party at controlling this risk. 
 The Contractor Group has the right to remove all or some of its personnel from the Company 
worksite, should the personnel, in the Contractor Group’s reasonable opinion, be imperilled 
by a lack of security, safety concerns, local conditions, terrorist acts and threats. The 
Company is obliged to assist in any evacuation of Contractor Group’s personnel, and the 
situation shall be considered as a Force Majeure situation. 
In addition to the contents stated above, the exhibit contains the following attachments: 
o Document Handling Instruction 
o Specification for Data Transfer to Operations 
o Requirements for DFO – Documents for Operations 
o MC/Commissioning Procedure 
However, none of the above-mentioned attachments contain any matters relevant for the 
topic of this report. 
Comment: This option provides a valuable opportunity for the Contractor in situations where there is 
a difference of opinion with regards to the view of the security level at the worksite, e.g. in situations 
where the Company might compromise the safety of the Contractor personnel.  
 
4.2.2.5 Exhibit F – HSE 
This exhibit presents the requirements of the Contractor with regards to health, safety and 
environment.  
 The Contractor and its Sub-Contractor(s) oblige to pursue the highest standards of HSE 
performance. There is however no reference to which standard this should be (ISO-standards 
or equivalent), other than “relevant HSE regulations”. 
Comment: This lack of specification of a safety standard to adhere to, might present the parties with 
challenges as the Work is performed and conflict with regards to the safety level arise. 
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 The Contractor shall ensure that its employees understand and are aware of any specific risks 
involved with performing the Work, and how these risks are managed. The Contractor is also 
responsible for the competence of the provided personnel to the Work, and to ensure that 
they possess the necessary technical and vocational training. 
Comment: No explicit or implicit definitions of risk are included. Nor does the text make any 
suggestions for tools to be used in the risk management efforts. 
 The Contractor shall also comply with and ensure that its own HSE Management System is 
compatible, as far as reasonably practicable, with the Company’s HSE Management System. 
Comment: Reaching a common understanding of risk and risk management between the contracting 
parties is important in the efforts to reduce the risk level connected with the work.  
 Material safety data sheets for chemicals and substances must meet the requirements of the 
authorities.  
 The Contractor is responsible for providing its own personnel with PPE suitable for the 
working environment and the risks the personnel are exposed to. 
 The Contractor is also required to co-operate with the Company in managing the 
environmental effects arising from the Work and operations, including minimizing the impact 
of the operation on the environment, both onshore and offshore. Further, the Contractor is 
obliged to notify the Company if any routine or non-routine emissions and discharges are 
made in connection with the Work. 
Comment: This highlights the parties’ joint responsibility in minimizing the environmental impact of 
the operations in connection with the Work. 
 All incidents and near-misses, that is, events that would become accidents under different 
circumstances, shall be reported to the Company. The Contractor is required to co-operate 
with the Company during investigations of said incidents, and to implement any corrective 
and preventive measures identified. 
 It is a requirement for the Contractor to measure and monitor the HSE performance when 
the Work is being performed. Should emergencies occur, the Contractor is obliged to provide 
an appropriate response and to facilitate support capabilities for emergency response in co-
operation with the Company. 
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Comment: Joint effort of risk mitigation and prevention in the aftermath of near-misses and 
occurred accidents presents an important measure to reduce the overall risk level. It is vital that this 
work involves both parties, as then both parties’ views and expertise on the matter are recorded.  
 
4.3 Comparative analysis between Contract 1 and Contract 2 
In the following text, a comparative analysis between Contract 1 and Contract 2 will be performed. 
This is of interest in order to see how the two different contracts with two different field operators 
and the same service company differ in its build-up and ruling principles, and to present some 
context to the interpretation of the contents of the two contracts. To separate the two customers 
involved in Contract 1 and Contract 2, they are further denoted as Company 1 for the company in 
Contract 1, and Company 2 for the company in Contract 2. 
When it comes to comparing different contracts with each other, there are some dimensions and 
features that are particularly interesting to look for. These features may have an impact on the 
important functions of the contracts, e.g. the division of liability and risk within the contractual 
relationship. The particularities in the two contracts which are the most interesting in this 
perspective include: 
 The difference in strength and size between the contracting parties in the contracts 
(financial, organizational, experience, etc.) 
 The relations between the contracting parties (former transactions, strategic positioning in 
the market, etc.) 
 The difference of nature of the contract object or delivery in the contracts (complexity, size, 
quantity, uniqueness, etc.) 
 The intrinsic differences in the terms and conditions of the contracts (chosen compensation 
format, weighing of liabilities in a particular direction, risk sharing, duration of contract, 
etc.) 
While Company 1 is a large player on the NCS, Company 2 carries less weight and experience in the 
same geographical area. This should emphasize the benefits of using standard contract formats, such 
as the NSC 05, to ensure that new entrants into the NCS can better implement and understand the 
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contracting traditions and practices in the area. It could also be assumed that Company 2, being 
strategically focused in other parts of the World, can introduce positive impulses to the Norwegian 
contracting traditions as well. This exchange can prove to be fruitful for all parties involved. It is 
however from the analyses, difficult to see any clear path of difference in the weighing of the 
contracts in a certain direction, as a consequence of the sizes and experience of the two different 
companies. The NSC 05 is to a large extent followed in both contracts, which makes them very 
aligned in the important matters concerning division of liabilities and risk. 
When it comes to difference in the relational factors in the two contracts, one should possibly expect 
a manifestation of some sort of evidence of a long-lasting relationship between the Service Company 
and Company 1 in Contract 1, and likewise signs of a new relationship between the parties in 
Contract 2. This could for instance be revealed by the level of detail in general provisions, which 
should be low in cases where the two contracting parties have encountered in several previous 
contracts with each other. However, no such indications could be found. The reason for this can, by 
all accounts, be assigned to the sheer complexity of the task and the values at stake, which requires a 
certain level of detail in the contracts anyhow. 
While Contract 1 is a frame agreement, with unknown length of time, Contract 2 is a service 
agreement with a time limitation of five (5) years. It must be assumed that the length of the frame 
agreement regulated by Contract 1 is limited to four (4) years, in accordance with “Forskrift om 
Offentlige Anskaffelser” (Regulations on Public Procurement) in Norwegian legislation. This makes 
them essentially like, in that both contracts present rather general provisions on the respective 
deliveries, while facilitating for more specific terms with the release of purchase and/or work orders. 
Also, both contracts concern the delivery of subsea systems, and while the system technology 
delivered in Contract 1 can be considered to be more novel than the one delivered for Contract 2, 
both contracts involve rather complex deliveries which require detailed regulation. Hence, there are 
no traces in any of the two contracts that might differentiate them on account on the nature of the 
respective deliveries they are concerning. 
The compensation formats chosen in Contract 1 differ from lump sum (fixed price) to day rates, unit 
rates and cost reimbursable, depending on what the compensation is concerning, i.e. equipment 
purchase, tool rental, use of onshore and offshore personnel, etc. The compensation formats in 
Contract 2 vary from day rates for rental equipment (tools) and personnel, to fixed unit rates for 
mobilization/ demobilization of equipment. Contract 2 also follows a cost reimbursement format for 
Third Party Services. That means that both contracts include a wide range of compensation formats, 
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and thus an effective spread of the risk between the parties, tied to the choice of compensation 
format (refer to discussion in chapter 2.1.2). However, Contract 1 includes a clause in which 
Company 1 reserves the privilege of deciding to compensate on a provisional sum basis, the rates 
and compensation which would otherwise be remunerated by unit rate or lump sum. Such a clause is 
not included in Contract 2. It is difficult to measure the effect that such a clause, tied to the choice of 
compensation format, will have on the distribution of risk between the parties. One can however 
assume that it will shift the weight in favour of Company 1, as the Service Company has got no say in 
this matter. 
To conclude, the two different contracts analysed in this report, are to a large degree very similar to 
each other. The fact that they are both based on, and, to a great extent follow the very same 
standard contract format, that is the NSC 05, supports this observation. There are no findings in any 
of the contracts which radicalize them in any way in relation to the NSC 05. However, there are of 
course some differences found in the details between the contracts.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
In the following chapter, the findings in the analysis chapter will be discussed. First, the 
implementation of operational risk in the contracts will be addressed, then the division of this risk 
between the parties. Finally, the potential weaknesses with the analyses will be presented to the 
reader, in order to shed some light on the methodology and findings leading to the results in this 
report. 
  
5.1 Implementation of operational risk in the contracts 
As stated in the analysis of both Contract 1 and Contract 2, operational risk is not explicitly 
mentioned in either of the two contracts. However, this may not necessarily be tantamount to 
operational risk not being addressed in the contracts at all. As mentioned in chapter 2.2.3, the 
concept of operational risk is usually applied more often in contexts of financial risk, and the 
definitions therein are hence not sufficiently, nor frequently, utilized in contracts of this particular 
type. This does not mean, however, that the concept is not taken care of and implemented to some 
degree in the contracts. Operational risk, as it is defined and understood within the boundaries of 
this report, is ever present in all accounts of the work that is regulated by the contracts. Hence, it is 
meaningful and necessary to include and implement some provisions regarding the concept of 
operational risk in the contracts. 
Both contracts are built on the foundations laid down by the standard contract formats, and most 
notably resemble the standard conditions provided by the NSC 05. The NSC 05 standard conditions of 
contract does not contain any explicit mentioning of the term operational risk either, but the same 
rationale as stated above could be applied for this. A finding that is worth noting is the fact that there 
are no references, in the two contracts, of the obligations of any of the parties of being in adherence 
with any risk management standard, such as the ISO 31000 Risk Management standard. There are no 
references of any standards (ISO or similar) in the NSC 05 either, but this is more understandable on 
account of NSC 05 being a set of more general terms and conditions. Referring to a standard in the 
NSC 05, could compromise its ability of being applicable for contracts regulating work in areas 
outside of the NCS as well, where other standards may be the norm. However, in a time when the 
focus on standardization and alignment of procedures and practices are prevalent, it is interesting 
that there are no references to a common standard in either of the contracts (Contract 1 and 
Contract 2).  
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In both contracts, there are provisions stating that the Contractor is obliged to align his HSE 
management system in accordance with that of the Company (Company 1 and Company 2 in the 
respective contracts), but the form and content of this system is not further specified. Risk 
management theory prescribes an alignment of strategies and the active use of risk management 
tools in the process of mitigating and reducing risk levels (see chapter 2.2.1). This certainly applies for 
the risk management work internally within an organization, but should also be transferred to the 
domain regulating the inter-organizational risk management aspects as well, such as in contracts that 
are governing matters between two companies. Settling and agreeing on the use of a common 
standard could aid in aligning the HSE systems, and hence contribute to an efficient risk management 
approach, of the two contracting parties. 
Reference to common risk management standards or not, there are findings of the two contracts 
treating situations characterized by risk and uncertainty. Examples of this include: 
 Loss of key personnel in the project 
 Equipment damages and failures 
 Third-party losses and indirect losses of the parties involved in the contract 
 Force majeure situations 
 Blow-outs and well problems 
 Injury to personnel 
The imperative with including provisions regarding such situations as listed above appears, above all, 
to be for declaring the liability and responsibility of the respective parties in the contract, not for 
prescribing any measures in mitigating these risks. It should be noted that is also the primary target 
of the contracts, that is, the primary purpose of a contract is to regulate the working relationship 
between the parties, and to allocate and make clear the division of responsibilities between them. 
However, it is difficult to say how the parties shall be able to adhere to the provisions of the contract 
and perform an active risk management, without also sharing a common and fundamental 
understanding of such essential terminology as risk. Hence, the lack of a common standard, and the 
lack of a proper definition of risk in the contracts, can cause problems in situations when the parties 
are in conflict over the degree of fulfilment of the contractual terms. As stated in the theory chapter, 
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operational risk is such a major presence in all operations involved in the work performed during the 
duration of the contract, and it should be addressed, treated and implemented accordingly. 
 
5.2 Division of operational risk in the contracts 
When it comes to the division of operational risk in the contracts analysed in this report, one has to 
base it on the actual contents of this type of risk found in the contracts. As discussed above, the term 
operational risk is not explicitly stated in either of the two contracts, so the focus here will be around 
how the contracts allocate responsibilities and liabilities that are fundamentally characterized by 
uncertainty and risk, interpreted in a broader sense. Using the NSC 05 as a reference, and working 
under the assumption that this standard set of conditions of contract represent a fair division of 
liabilities, it is clear from the findings in the analyses that the contracts are mostly in line with the 
standard format. However, there are also findings of instances in the contracts where there are 
deviations from the principles laid down in the NSC 05, and where the terms and conditions favour 
the benefits of one of the parties. Examples of these findings from the analysis of Contract 1 are 
discussed below. As in chapter 4.3, the Company in Contract 1 is denoted Company 1, and likewise, 
the Company in Contract 2 is denoted as Company 2. 
 Under the part where the articles concerning performance of the Work are listed (part II), 
only the obligations of the Contractor are listed, and not the obligations of Company 1, which 
is the case in the same articles in the NSC 05, where both parties’ obligations are listed. This 
is also the case under the article concerning effects of the variations to the work (article 13), 
where it is stated that the Contractor’s obligations under the Contract also apply for variation 
work, and statements of Company 1’s obligations are omitted again. This may not have a 
great significance in practical terms, as Company 1 is liable in many other instances in other 
articles throughout Contract 1, but it leaves the impression that the contract is more one-
sided rather than bilateral.  
 Company 1 reserves the right of approving the Contractor personnel performing the Work 
under the Contract. As discussed previously, this addresses Company 1’s desire of controlling 
the risks involved with key personnel in the project, but may also be viewed as an attempt at 
exerting influence in an area that is well within the Contractor’s own control sphere. It is an 
accepted view in risk theory, that the risk (in this case the risk involving key personnel) 
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should be handled by the party that is best able to mitigate this risk. In this case that would 
be the Contractor. 
 In article 27 – Company’s Breach of Contract in NSC 05, the Contractor is given the option of 
suspending or terminating the Contract should Company 1 be in substantial breach of the 
Contract. Such an option is not given the Contractor under Contract 1. This should be in 
accordance with commonly accepted contract principles, and both parties should be given 
the equal opportunity of terminating or suspending the contract in the event where the 
other is in substantial breach of the contract. 
 Company 1 reserves the right of choosing to compensate the Contractor on a provisional 
sum basis, for remunerations that would otherwise be compensated by lump sum or by unit 
rates. According to contract theory, presented in chapter 2.1.2, the selection of 
compensation format presents a significant influence on the division of risk between the 
contracting parties. As such, being deprived of the privilege of having a say on the chosen 
form of compensation format, the Contractor loses some of his ability to influence his risk 
exposure in the Contract.  
It is difficult to speculate on how this imbalance in the contractual terms might influence the 
practical work and the day-to-day dealings of the two parties, and how this might manifest itself in 
times of conflict.  However, Contract 1 also presents some important shields for the Contractor, e.g. 
in the event of blow-outs, well problems, damage to third party equipment, injury and death of 
personnel, etc. The Contractor is also shielded against the risk of decreasing rates, after altering 
contract rates through the use of escalation formulae. The limitations and shields are manifested by 
monetary terms, expressed as percentages of the contract value. With the introduction of such 
limitations of liability, the total risk exposure of the Contractor is capped to a level which is thought 
to be well within the capabilities of the Contractor’s risk absorption abilities. As presented in the 
chapter on risk theory, the Company is the better party at diversifying the bigger parts of the risk 
exposure in a project, not only because of its greater abilities of spreading the risk on a larger project 
portfolio and in joint ventures, but also on account of their normally more solid financial position. 
This principle is most definitely attended to here.  
In the analysis of Contract 2, many of the similar findings as in Contract 1, was observed. In addition, 
the following findings are worth noting: 
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 Under Article 6 – Company Provided Documents, the Contractor is obliged to swiftly (without 
undue delay) notify the Company of any errors in the Company Provided Documents. Should 
the Contractor fail to find any errors in these documents, and this incurs direct extra costs for 
the Company in connection with the Work, then all such costs shall be borne by the 
Contractor. The same rule and obligation does not apply for Company 2 with regards to the 
Contractor Provided Documents under article 7 in Contract 2. This liability should be mutual. 
 Under Article 32 – Limitation and exclusion of liability in Contract 2, the total liability for the 
Contractor in case of Breach of Contract is limited to 100% of the Purchase Order Value (i.e. 
Contract Price), as opposed to 25% of the Contract Price in NSC 05 (Article 34.2). This 
presents a significant added percentage amount for the Contractor in Contract 2, and 
increases the risk exposure of the Contractor. 
 The Contractor is responsible, under Article 37 – Care of Company owned equipment and/or 
materials in Contract 2, for ensuring the safekeeping of, and making good any damages or 
losses, to Company owned equipment and materials. As discussed in chapter 2.2.2.4, the risk 
of damage and loss of equipment is present in many stages of the operations where the 
equipment is utilized (transport, rig handling, during equipment operations, etc.). As the 
Contractor is usually the one responsible for operating this equipment and handling the 
material, he is the party closest to controlling this risk. As such, this presents a fair division of 
the risk of equipment failure. An upper limit of liability of $250,000 is included for any 
occurrence. This shields the Contractor against the most severe cases of equipment and 
material damages. 
In Contract 1, there is a clause stating that the rates after escalation shall in no circumstances be less 
than before escalation. Such a clause is not included in Contract 2. Hence, the prices charged for the 
services of the Contractor may be lower after escalation in Contract 2. This means that the 
Contractor and Company 2 share the risk of price volatility, which is based on factors that are, to a 
large extent, outside of the control spheres of both parties. As such, it presents a fair division of risk, 
and acts in accordance with presented risk theory. It could, however, also be argued that the 
Company is the party that is better suited at absorbing the risk of price volatility, due to its normally 
better financial solidity and abilities of diversifying risk. On the other hand, the Contractor, who reaps 
the benefits of higher rates in times of growth, should also be positioned to handle the risks of falling 
prices in times of decline. 
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To conclude, it is difficult to say that there are findings in the analyses where the contracts prescribe 
a disproportional amount of risk exposure for any of the parties. For the most parts, the contracts are 
in line with the provisions of NSC 05, but there are findings which could support a view that the 
companies (Company 1 and Company 2) are slightly more favoured than the Contractor under the 
contracts than they would be under NSC 05. 
  
5.3 Potential weaknesses in the analysis 
When conducting analyses, there will always be inherent weaknesses which need to be addressed. 
The cause and nature of the weaknesses may be different from one analysis to the other, and it is 
important to acknowledge that no analysis is a perfect rendition of the true state of the subject that 
is being analysed. All results need to be interpreted in light of context, and scrutinized closely by the 
reader. As with determining risk levels, the search for true objectivity will in most cases not be 
fruitful. On this account, there is a need for presenting the potential weaknesses and factors which 
might be undermining the results of the analysis for the reader. Some important factors which may 
impact the interpretation of the results in the analyses in this report are reflected upon below. 
In the analyses, the NSC 05 was used as a reference for interpreting and comparing the contents of 
the two contracts. It was assumed that the terms and conditions of the NSC 05, being formed in joint 
effort between representatives of both field operators and service companies, ensured a sufficient 
implementation, and fair division of liabilities, responsibilities and risk between the parties. However, 
this may not necessarily be the case. The NSC 05 may not be perfect and may not allocate the risks 
and responsibilities in an efficient manner, and as such, may not be the best reference point for 
evaluating the fairness of the contracts. In practice it may be viewed as unfair and present a skewed 
distribution of liabilities and responsibilities by the parties using the standard. If so, this presents a 
challenge to the interpretation of the results in this analysis, as the reference point is altered. 
It may also present some issues with not having a proper definition of the term operational risk 
included in the work of the report, and only a mere quasi-definition based on the wider term risk. 
After all, searching for contents of operational risk without having a clearly stated definition to work 
with can provide some serious challenges, both for the work performed by the author and also the 
interpretation of the work by the reader. Constructing a proper and sound definition of the term for 
use within the boundaries of the topic of this work, would however be outside of the scope of this 
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report. Also, the discussion presented in chapter 2.2.3 on operational risk, should be sufficient to give 
the reader an understanding of what the author puts into the term.    
The contracts analysed in this report are used for regulating relationships, events and situations 
which may be characterized by high complexity, and possess a wide range of severity. Consequently, 
assessing the formulations of the terms and conditions in the contracts, and the impact they will 
have on the overall risk level for the involved parties, becomes a challenging task. The consequential 
spectrum from changing, say the formulation of a sentence in an article and thereby giving it a new 
meaning, to altering the liability limits for the contractor, may have an unimaginable range. The 
effects of such changes and the significance of the risk sharing between the two parties may be 
extremely difficult to measure in monetary terms, and nearly impossible to determine with regards 
to intangible assets. As such, the valuation of the risk division found in the terms and condition of the 
contracts, are open for interpretation. The author’s lack of experience with regards to such work 
should be taken into account by the reader. However the findings are, at the best of knowledge, 
interpreted in light of recognized contract and risk theory.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter will present a conclusion to the hypothesis stated in the beginning of the report (chapter 
1.2), and thereby complete the work in this report. Also, for further studies on this topic, a few 
suggestions are made, for what may enhance the understanding of implementation of operational 
risk in oil service contracts. 
 
6.1 Conclusion to the hypothesis 
The hypothesis, H1, in this report was: 
“Operational risk is well implemented and shared between the parties in contracts between the 
Service Company and its clients.” 
Its corresponding null hypothesis, H0, was stated as: 
“Operational risk is not well implemented and shared between the parties in contracts between the 
Service Company and its clients”. 
As discussed in the introduction chapter of the report, the use of the phrase “well implemented and 
shared” in the hypothesis, invites to a certain subjective interpretation, as assessing the degree of 
implementation and sharing of a concept such as operational risk in a contract is very hard to present 
objectively. However, when it comes to general risk sharing in contracts, the theory presented in this 
report is a good reference and serves as an adequate backdrop. As stated before, the term 
operational risk is not mentioned in any parts of the contracts analysed in this report. However, as 
operational risk was understood in this report to be a part of the definition of the more general term 
risk, only more specific for the day-to-day risk exposure in the activities and operations of a company 
or organization, it must be accepted to also include findings of implementation and sharing of the 
general term risk in the contracts. 
Anyhow, with this in mind, and based on the findings in the analysis, the conclusion to the hypothesis 
in this report is: 
Operational risk is not well implemented and shared between the parties in contracts between the 
Service Company and its clients. 
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In other words, the null hypothesis, H0, is closer to the findings in the analysis than the hypothesis, 
H1. The rationale behind this conclusion is that there was not found any explicit and only weak traces 
of implicit definitions of risk in the analysed contracts. There were not found any definitions, or 
mentioning, of operational risk in the contracts. Nor were there any references to any risk 
management standards, such as the ISO 31000 or equivalent, to be used by the parties in the 
connection with the contract work, establishing a common understanding of risk between the 
parties.  
There are most certainly implemented measures in the contracts for sharing the liabilities and 
responsibilities involved with the work, and hence, indirectly, the risks involved in the contracts. This 
was also found to be in line with relevant and accepted contract and risk theory, as presented in this 
report. As such, one could argue that the contracts include some degree of implementation and 
sharing of risk. However, the contracts lack a proper explicit statement of how risk and, more 
specifically, operational risk is to be defined, understood and managed, in terms that are clear and 
unequivocal for all parties involved in the contracts. This implies that the hypothesis, H1, which 
requires that operational risk is well implemented, cannot be argued as being fulfilled.   
 
6.2 Suggestion for further studies 
When working on a report such as this, several ideas are created on topics that would be interesting 
to do further research on, in relation to the findings in the work. The ideas could be related to topics 
that were outside of the scope of this report, or they could be generated as the work progressed, but 
not included here as there would not be sufficient time to implement them in the work. 
As mentioned throughout the work, and as concluded in this chapter, operational risk is not well 
implemented and shared in the contracts between the Service Company and its customers. An 
interesting study could then be to investigate how this is best implemented in the contracts, to 
ensure a sufficient degree of understanding and communication of this important subject. Would it 
be appropriate to include references to risk management standards (such as the ISO 31000) or would 
it perhaps be better for the parties to agree on a common definition of risk and/or operational risk, 
and to draw up common tools for managing risk in the contracts? With the development in the 
industry, and the increased focus on risk management, there is certainly a need for implementing 
joint terminology for risk in the contracts. A shared understanding of the term could only be 
contributing to a more efficient risk management in the projects.  
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